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1.1. State Aid as Concept 
The article 3(3) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) imposes that ‘[t]he Union 
shall establish an internal market’. Any advantage that benefits a company over 
others may thus distort competition, and must be prohibited. The Commission su-
pervises that the competition is not distorted1. 
The competition may be interfered through several kind of ways. For example, ben-
eficial tax measures may threaten the internal market. In this regard, it is talked 
about harmful tax competition. One of the current ways to approach the target of 
tackling the harmful tax competition has been intervening in the states’ taxation 
through a State aid control. State aid supervision indeed is a useful tool to intervene 
in the taxation of Member states. Simply, because while the fundamental freedoms 
do not apply to pure internal situations, the rules on State aids do.2 
In addition, EU law, and thus State aid law respectively, takes precedence over 
national law and has a direct effect.3 Thus, despite of the fact that the direct taxation 
falls within the competence of the member states, State aid regulation however sets 
some limits in which the states may exercise their competences. It follows that State 
aid in the context of taxation is an area where two legal competences conflict.  
The applying legal basis here is TFEU 63, imposing on the free movement of capital, 
whereas the paragraph 1(a) of Article 65 TFEU imposes a derogation on taxation 
matters, i.e. that the member states remain free ‘to apply the relevant provisions of 
their tax law, which distinguish between taxpayers who are not in the same situation4 
with regard to their place of residence or with regard to the place where their capital 
is invested’.   
Nevertheless, it is settled view that the competences of Member states have limita-
tions and they must exercise the retained powers in accordance with the Community 
                                                 
1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. 
2 Rossi-Maccanico, Pierpaolo 2013, page 1. 
3 The direct effect of European law has been enshrined by the Court of Justice in Judgment of the 
Court of 5 February 1963. C-26-62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend 
& Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration.  
4 About the comparability issue between resident and non-resident funds, see Tomi Viitala ‘Compa-
rability of Different CIVs under EU Law’ in The Tax Treatment of CIVs and REITs. 2013. IBFD, 




law.5 For example, the freedom of establishment must be obeyed. Yet, the prevailing 
outlook is that the ‘limits apply only to the competences exercised by the Member 
States and thus they remain free to determine the organisation and conception of 
their tax system’.6 Even so, the tax base harmonization project in progress, is al-
ready de facto limiting the possibility to determine the organisation of the tax system.  
State aid is not a recently introduced concept, as the State aid control were already 
included in the Treaty of Rome in 1957.7 The main rationale back then was to avoid 
subsidy race, which could threaten the internal market. For decades, taxation did 
not often show up in the State aid examinations. It was not until 1990s, when the 
Commission started to pay more attention to the harmful tax competition. In 1998, 
‘A Notice on the Application of State aid Rules to Direct Taxation’ was published.8 
During the years, the emphasis of State aid control has shifted towards the govern-
ments’ intervention in the economy.9  
The current reform period started in 2012, when the Commission launched the State 
aid Modernisation program (i.e. SAM). The purpose of the modernisation program 
was to clarify the notion and explanations of State aid.10 As will be later seen, the 
clarification process has not been a success story.  
1.2. Common Investment Vehicles 
This study concerns common investment vehicles (CIV) in the context of State aid. 
Generally depicted, a CIV, or as an investment ‘common investment’, is an alterna-
tive for a direct individual investment. What makes the investment ‘common’ is the 
pooling of investors’ assets and creating an intermediary which then acts as a man-
                                                 
5 C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Roland Schumacker, 14 February 1995, para 21. 
6 C-446/03, Marks & Spencer. Opinion of advocate General Maduro, 7 April 2005, paras 21-22.  
7 For early cases dealing with tax State aid, see C-30/59, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in 
Limburg v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, Judgment of the Court of 23 
February 1961.  
8 Commission Notice on the application of the State aid rules to measures relating to direct busi-
ness taxation 1998, C 384, 10.12.1998, page 3–9.  
9 López, Juan Jorge Piernas, 2015, page 11.; Speech of Commissioner Vestager at High Level Fo-
rum of Member States (18 December 2014). 
10 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of the Regions of EU, State 




ager for the assets.  From perspective of taxation, it is likely that this additional in-
termediary level will be taxed, and thus the structure will lead to multiple taxation.11 
Therefore, tax measures are needed for reaching the objective of tax neutrality. 
What kind of tax measures are then legitimate for states to enact, depends much 
on the State aid law. The State aid concept ranges all kind of tax measures, and 
hence also the concept of CIV. As will be seen, it is far from clear how these rules 
allow to impose measures with a purpose of tax neutrality for example.    
CIV is an internationally used concept. The investments through the CIV-structure 
play an important role in the global markets. The total net assets in worldwide reg-
ulated funds alone hit 49.3 trillion USD in the end of 2017 and the net assets more 
than doubled their level since 2008, according the Investment Company Institute.12 
Alone the numbers relating to the funds indicate the significance of the issue.   
2. Scope of Study, Materials and Methods 
This paper focuses on to the common investment vehicles in the State aid context, 
seeking to answer to what kind of CIV related indirect tax measures are prohibited 
from the State aid concept perspective, whether the case law of the ECJ is con-
sistent and what is the reason for the lack of case law. Consequently, this paper 
asks what kinds of issues the states must consider when they design CIV-measures. 
These main research questions are further divided into sub-questions, which will be 
handled in the different sub-sections.  
The author noted in the very beginning that there is a need for this study. First of all 
there does not seem to be research on this topic; no systematisation apart from the 
Commission’s writings, and only a few academic articles dating back to many years. 
The case law on the matter is also controversial and inconsistent. The articles writ-
ten seem to wonder the perpetual change of concepts and terms of use.  As a con-
sequence, no one seem to know what the actual state of law ultimately is. 
                                                 
11 Vermeulen, Hein 2014, pages 3-4.  
12 Investment Company Institute (ICI), 2018 Investment Company Fact Book.  
 
According to their website: ‘ICI, following standards set by the International Investment Funds As-
sociation (IIFA), defines regulated funds as collective investment pools that are substantively regu-




When seeking an answer to the question of what kind of arrangements constitute 
prohibited State aid in the CIV context, the rulings of the ECJ are the main source 
of research. That simply stems from the reason that the State aid articles itself are 
open and general, leaving much discretion for practitioners. Thus, this paper mainly 
analyses the case law of the ECJ, and uses legal academic literature as a source 
and support, when examining whether there lies any systematic ruling practises. 
Therefore, State aid research in this study is mainly based on legal doctrine, with a 
general goal to systematize and interpret the law. This study begins with the purpose 
to understand the present total picture.  
Every State aid case ruling requires much comparing. First, the Article 107(1) TFEU, 
which is the legal basis for the issue, requires internal comparing (as will be seen in 
the further chapters). When the Court must also weigh the situation against settled 
case law, the scheme is compared again. These comparative aspects or questions 
of comparison, which occur in different stages of State aid investigation, is also 
something that makes this study somewhat challenging. It is through analogy how 
the situations are compared, which is why the outcome can never be true and con-
sistent in such a way as it would be in natural sciences. Hence, the author is con-
scious about the limits. Therefore, this study, as any other, can only outline the 
vague borderlines. Consequently, the main sub-research question of this paper is 
what the comparison group in the CIV-context is and how is this comparison process 
concluded. Furthermore, what kind of situations or groups actually can be compared 
and to what extent.  
As stated above, the State aid concept ranges all kind of tax measures. Also the 
ones that concern the tax treaties. Sometimes, also the tax treaty articles have been 
interpreted as granting State aid. Nevertheless, in the context of CIVs this problem 
does not seem to be the main concern and thus the tax treaty issues are excluded 
from this study. The tax treaty aspect connects also to the cross-border situations 
which are also excluded from this study. It is indeed likely that the investors, the CIV 
and the investment(s) lie all in different countries and thus under different jurisdic-
tions. The cross-border situations therefore bring quite a challenging aspect to the 
State aid examination.  
The agenda of this paper begins with addressing the general guiding principles of 




The focus will lie on the problematic definition of selectivity. It is then in the follow-
up sections, where the State aid is analysed with regard to the CIVs and where the 
case law is scrutinized. The cases of ECJ will demonstrate what kinds of situations 
have been regarded prohibited and what are the key conceptions used in the cases. 
Before analysing the case law, a typical structure of CIV will be described.  
At this point, a few words must be said too about the special status and features of 
EU law. The application of EU law is often strongly teleological, as the EU law must 
be interpreted taking into account the goals of EU and directives.13 The decisions of 
the ECJ also have a pronounced importance. 
3. Commission and Court - Competences and Supervising Au-
thority 
The Commission has a special role as a State aid supervisor (The Article 108 
TFEU). It supervises the existing State aid regimes and if it notices an aid which is 
misused or incompatible with the internal marker, it shall require that the regime is 
either abolished or altered. Entirely new State aid regimes must also be reported to 
the Commission.14 This position is apt to provoke questions of the competences 
between Commission and the Court. 
According to the Article 108 TFEU, the Council may on application by a Member 
State, decide that the aid is compatible with the internal market, in derogation from 
the provisions of Article 107 TFEU, requiring that the decision is justified by excep-
tional circumstances.  
Despite of the Commission’s supervising position, the first source to examine the 
State aid is always the case law. It is the Court, which has the power to interpret the 
Treaties. 
In the Notice 2016, the Commission indeed stated that because State aid is a con-
cept defined directly by the Treaty, the Commission will simply clarify the provisions, 
in line with the EU case-law, without prejudice to the interpretation of the Court of 
                                                 
13 C-27/07, Banque Fédérative du Crédit Mutuel v Ministre de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’In-
dustrie, Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 3 April 2008 para 22. See also, C-292/94 Den-
kavit, paras 24 ja 26. 
14 Alkio, Mikko 2016. E-book, section: Verkkokirjahylly>Julkisoikeus>Valtiontuet>10 VALTIONTU-




Justice of the European Union.15 It seems that the competences of the Commission 
and the Court are consistent and both sharing the same view. Thus, in this paper 
the Commission’s Notices are also used as a source, since the Notice strongly leans 
on the ECJ’s decisions and because it is the Commission who supervises the State 
aids issued by the Member States.  
Yet, the Commission’s decision-making is not nevertheless the decisive factor when 
examining State aid. This has been expressly confirmed in the CIV context. The 
sole decisive element is whether the measure favours certain undertakings or not16.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Commission competence however is not of the same kind in the whole State aid 
field. The guidelines given by virtue of Article 107(3) TFEU and the ones given on 
the interpretation of the Article 107(1) TFEU must be kept apart. The latter concerns 
an area where the Commission does not have any discretion to interpret the Treaty, 
but can only express its view.17 Notwithstanding, as above mentioned, it seems that 
the Commission shares the view on the application of the Article 107(1) with the 
Court.  
On the opposite, the Article 107(1) TFEU, the Commission has an exclusive com-
petence to assess whether an aid is compatible with the internal market under the 
Article 107(3) TFEU. This principle stems from the case law.18 The Article 107(3) 
TFEU gives to the Commission the power to accept measures designed to facilitate 
certain economic activities, which constitute State aid prima facie. The Commission 
has continuously used this position and issued communications, entitled as ‘guide-
lines’, ‘notices’ and ‘frameworks’. 
The guidelines concerning the Article 107(3) TFEU bind the Member States to the 
extent that they are consistent with the Treaty and that they do not infer to already 
existing aid measures.1920 The binding strength towards the Member States results 
                                                 
15 2016 Commission Notice, para 4.  
16 T-445/05, Fineco, para 145.  
17 C-83/98, France v. Landbroke Racing Ltd and Commission, para 25. Forrester, Emily 2018, 
page 20. 
18 C-431/14, Hellenic Republic v. European Commission, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston 
delivered on 15 October 2015, paras 36–38 and the case law cited therein: C-667/13, Banco 
Privado Português and Massa Insolvente do Banco Privado Português, para 66.  
19 Bouchagiar, Antonios 2017. Footnote 16 with reference to: T-114/02 BaByliss v Commission.  




from the fact that the guidelines bind the institution that has an exclusive compe-
tence (i.e. Commission) to assess the compatibility of the measure.21 
4. Relevance of European Free Trade Association  
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) decisions are also referred in this re-
search for the reason that The Article 61 of the European Economic Area Agreement 
(EEA Agreement) contains a provision which is virtually identical to the Article 107(1) 
TFEU. Secondary EU State aid legislation applies to the members of EFTA equally 
(to the countries that have concluded the EEA Agreement). However, these coun-
tries are subject to the adaptations in Annex XV of the EEA Agreement. The Article 
7 of the EEA Agreement imposes the effect of EU Directives and regulations.22  
Moreover, the EEA State aid Rules are to be interpreted as the EU State aid rules.23 
The EFTA Surveillance Authority has also issued Guidelines, which aim to consoli-
date the procedural and substantive EU State aid guidelines.24 
5. Definition of State aid: Four Cumulative Criteria 
State aid definition is regulated in the Article 107 TFEU, which declares that: 
‘[...] any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any 
form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favour-
ing certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as 
it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal 
market.’ 
The article is read as including four cumulative criteria. First, it must be due to the 
state resources, secondly, it must distort or threaten to distort competition, thirdly, it 
must create an advantage and fourthly, it must be selective.25  
TFEU 107(1) is applied only to undertakings. An undertaking has been consistently 
defined by the Court of Justice as an entity ‘engaged in an economic activity, re-
gardless of their legal status and the way in which they are financed’. Economic 
                                                 
21 Bouchagiar, Antonios 2017, page 166.  
22 Bacon, Kelyn 2017, page 126-127. 
23 Article 3 of the Surveillance and Court Agreement and Articles 6, 7 and 105-107 of EEA Agree-
ment. See also a case: E-9/12 Iceland v EFTA Surveillance Authority (judgment of 22 July 2013) 
24 Bacon, Kelyn 2017, page 127 with reference to EFTA Surveillance Authority State Aid Guide-
lines.  




activity is a type of activity which consists of ‘offering goods or services on a market’. 
What then is considered as a market depends from the context, country and even, 
according to the 2016 Notice, ‘from time to time’. ‘Several separate legal entities’ 
may also be seen as constituting an entity for State aid purposes’. 26 The question 
of separate legal entities is important in the CIV context as well, especially on the 
intermediary level, where there may be a separate manager companies from the 
actual ‘vehicle company’. 
State aid can occur in various forms. It was already in the 60s when the Court first 
stated in a clear way that an aid is wider concept than a subsidy, as an aid embraces 
not only positive benefits, but also interventions which mitigate charges.27 The con-
cept of State aid must be applied to an objective situation and is evaluated on the 
date when the Commission takes its decision.28 
The market economy operator test, as used normally in the State aid assessment, 
cannot be used in tax cases, for the reason that taxes are an expression of the 
fundamental sovereignty of states. Private persons can neither levy taxes nor grant 
reliefs.29 
Usually, the decisive criterion is the selectivity. It is often that when the selectivity 
criterion is fulfilled, the rest of the criteria are almost automatically fulfilled. The four 
criteria will be shortly examined in the sub-sections below.  
5.1. State Resources and Imputability 
To be an aid that is prohibited, it must be imputable to the state. There is no require-
ment of positive transfer and hence it is sufficient that the state will have for example 
a shortfall of taxes.30 A prohibited aid may be granted indirectly and the prohibition 
cannot be removed by granting the aid through a private entity/entities.31 The word 
                                                 
26 2016 Commission Notice, paras 6-13. 
27 C-30/59, De Gezamenlijke Steenkolenmijnen in Limburg v High Authority of the European Coal 
and Steel Community. 
28 T-445/05, Fineco, para 145. 
29 Schön, Wolfgang 2016.  
30 2016 Commission Notice, para 51.  
31 T-136/05, EARL Salvat père & fils, Comité interprofessionnel des vins doux naturels et vins de 
liqueur à appellations contrôlées (CIVDN) and Comité national des interprofessions des vins à ap-
pellation d'origine (CNIV) v Commission of the European Communities, summary point 4 and paras 




imputable includes two aspects: first the aid must be granted through state re-
sources, but must also derive from state resources.32 
5.2. Distortion of Competition and Effect on Trade 
One must note that only the threat to distort competition is sufficient to fulfil this 
criterion. The small amount of aid or the fact that the aid recipient is a small company 
does not preclude the aid. Thus, the effect on trade can be insignificant, but still the 
is aid prohibited.33 The distortion is assessed within internal market, not within a 
state. Sufficient for fulfilling this criterion is for example that a position of an eco-
nomic operator has strengthened when compared to its competition group(s).34  
5.3.  Advantage 
Even though the advantage often follows from the selectivity, it is regarded as a 
separate criterion. An advantage is ‘any economic benefit which an undertaking 
could not have obtained under normal market conditions, that is to say in the ab-
sence of State intervention’35.  
The State aid examination is not about determining the objective of the measure but 
about examining what is the effect of the measure in question. This has been the 
settled view since 1974.36 Thus, it is not possible to avoid the State aid inspection 
by explaining that the measure is a tax measure or that it is part of a section that is 
outside of the competences of EU, (e.g. social- and healthcare sector). 
The advantage can be temporary37, direct or indirect. In the context of taxation, an 
aid can also be a condonation of tax.38 The examination is done internally, i.e. within 
a state. The position of competing undertakings in other member states do not rule 
out the advantage.39 Furthermore, it would be impossible to make a comparison 
                                                 
32 T-309/04, T-317/04, T-329/04 and T-336/04, TV 2/Danmark A/S and Others v Commission of the 
European Communities, para 157. 
33 2016 Commission Notice, para 189. 
34 C-730/79, Philip Morris 1980, paras 11-12. 
35 C-39/94, SFEI and Others, para 60. See also: C-342/96, Spain v Commission, para 41. 
36 C-173-73, Family allowances in the textile industry. Italian Republic v Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, paras 27-28.  
37 T-67/94, Ladbroke Racing Ltd v Commission of the European Communities, para 78. 
38 2016 Commission Notice, para 170 and footnote 256 with reference to Commission Decision 
2003/601/EC of 17 February 2003 on the Foreign Income aid scheme implemented by Ireland (OJ 
L 204, 13.8.2003, page 51), recitals 33 to 35.  
39 2016 Commission Notice, para 72. With reference to C-173-73, Family allowances in the textile 
industry. Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities, para 17. See also T-55/99, 




with an ‘EU standard’, simply due to the fact that the states have the sovereignty to 
determine their tax system and any kind of ‘abstract notion of what a tax system 
should look like’ would be a breach of EU law.40 
Advantage and selectivity examinations remind each other, but are still seemingly 
separate concepts. It is not always clear, under which concept of these two, a certain 
matter is researched. The matter of ‘conferred tests’ will be examined later on this 
study. 
5.4. Selectivity 
The measure is selective if it favours ‘certain undertakings or the production of cer-
tain goods’. However, not all favouring measures are automatically prohibited State 
aid and thus under the scope of TFEU 117(1). According to the Commission Notice, 
the measure must grant an advantage in a selective way to certain undertaking, 
groups of undertakings or economic sectors in order to be prohibited. The fact that 
the measure is general, open to all entities or that there are objectively determined 
requisites to receive the aid, do not mean that the aid could not be selective.41 Nei-
ther the fact that the measure concerns a whole economic sector, does exclude the 
selectivity.42 Selectivity and State aid may also occur despite of the fact that numer-
ous undertakings are able to claim the advantage, or that they exercise different 
activities.43  
The author’s view is that selectivity as a general concept has partly developed 
through this kind of exclusive analysing, i.e. by determining which kind of situations 
do not exclude the selectivity. Yet, when speaking of a certain area, for example 
taxation, there are own characteristic specialities which must be taken into account 
in the selectivity analysis. Hence, the rulings given in the taxation concept, have 
determined the concept of selectivity with relation to a certain a specific scheme. 
Here the argumentation style has been more including kind, i.e. ruling the trigger 
situations.  
                                                 
40 Fort, Edouard 2017 page 376.; Engelen, Frank & Gunn, Anna , page 141. 
41 2016 Commission Notice, para 117-118.  
42 C-78/08 Paint Graphos, para 53. T-445/05, Fineco, para 155. 




With reference to fiscal matters, it has been ruled that if the fiscal advantage is avail-
able without distinction to all economic operators in a jurisdiction it is not selective.44 
However, at least theoretically, one can arrange one’s affairs in a manner that meet 
the requirements of a certain tax measure. It can be argued, that fundamentally all 
the tax benefits are available to all taxpayers. Despite of this theoretical possibility, 
the underlying understanding of competition law is such that it is needed to look the 
taxpayers’ current economic activity.45 Thus, the author sees that the argumentation 
used in Navantia means in practise that only very general measures can be (at least 
almost) automatically regarded as non-selective. Consequently, any tax measure 
relating to the CIV structure cannot apply to all economic operators. 
Selectivity is traditionally categorised to a material and regional selectivity, as it is 
also in the Commission Notice. The material selectivity means that a measure in 
question applies only to a certain undertaking(s) or certain sectors in a member 
state. Material selectivity can be by nature de jure or de facto selectivity. De jure 
selectivity is directly due to the legal criteria46, whereas de facto selectivity is a much 
more unclear concept, and is due to an overall situation, which in turn results to the 
selectivity. The concept of de facto selectivity will be dealt in a later chapter. 
When dealing with the regional selectivity the examination begins with looking 
whether the measure applies to an entire territory of member state. If so, then in 
principle selectivity is excluded. However, neither is this utterly clear, as also stated 
in the Notice: ‘[t]he reference system does not necessarily have to be defined as the 
entire Member State’.47 Material selectivity will not be dealt in any more detail in this 
study. 
A test of selectivity has been developed to assess the selectivity. The test itself is 
far from unequivocal, mainly due to that the test, as well as the terms used for de-
scribing the test, have changed over last decade. Despite of many attempts to con-
struct a coherent and systematic assessment test, it seems that it is a never-ending 
project.  
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Traditionally, the ‘derogation-test’ was applied. This derogation test first identifies 
the general regime and then assesses whether a derogation exists in favour of cer-
tain undertakings. Historically, this test is based on a decision Italian textiles and 
was to a large extent adopted by the 1998 Notice.48 The main problem in the dero-
gation test was the determining of normal tax regime and then specifying the dero-
gation. The problematic question often being whether the measure is an integral 
part of the regime rather than an exception. 
Nowadays, it seems that the derogation test is not used anymore, but the so called 
‘comparison test’ rules in the arguments of the ECJ. Although, it must be noted al-
ready at this point that the current comparison test does have an element of dero-
gation. The comparison test and the new notion of selectivity was initially shaped in 
the case Adria-Wien Pipeline.49 The ‘comparison test’ according to Adria-Wien Pipe-
line does not focus on the derogation nature but rather looks at the recipients of tax 
measure as follows:  
‘( . . .) under a particular statutory scheme, a State measure is such as to 
favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods ( . . .) in com-
parison with other undertakings which are in a legal and factual situation that 
is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in ques-
tion.’50  
The wording in the Adria-Wien Pipeline have been under discussion in many aca-
demic writings, especially the passage ‘in the light of the objective pursued by the 
measure in question’. As already stated in this paper, it is namely the effects of 
measure, not the objective, which determines whether selectivity exists.  
The determining by no means did not stop to Adria-Wien Pipeline. A few years later, 
the Court laid down the conditions for the selectivity in a more coherent manner in 
the landmark case Paint Graphos.51 The construction was different compared to 
what was stated in Adria-Wien Pipeline a few years earlier. In Paint Graphos the 
Court stated that:  
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‘It is therefore necessary to determine whether tax exemptions [...] are liable 
to favour certain undertakings or the production of certain goods by compar-
ison with other undertakings which are in a comparable factual and legal sit-
uation, in the light of the objective pursued by the corporation tax regime, 
namely the taxation of company profits.’52 
As a consequence, the three-step assessment test was laid down in Paint Graphos. 
The Court stated that in order to classify a domestic tax measure as State aid, it is 
at first necessary to determine ‘a common or normal regime applicable in the state 
concerned’. It is then assessed in relation to this common system whether the meas-
ure in question derogates from the regime inasmuch as it differentiates between 
economic operators, who ‘in light of the objective assigned to the tax system of the 
Member State concerned, are in a comparable factual and legal situation’. The third 
assessment step asks whether the measure is justified by the ‘nature or scheme’ of 
the system.53 It should be noted, that it is not always necessary to address all these 
three steps. If the measure is obviously prima facie selective, that suffices and there 
is no need to assess the justification condition.54 The prima facie selectivity means 
simply that the basic condition is fulfilled, i.e. that the measure ‘favours certain un-
dertakings or the production of certain goods which are in a comparable legal and 
factual situation’.55 This three-step test is also the chore structure for this study. 
Despite of the special features of taxation, it is the three-step assessment test that 
is applied also in the fiscal matters.56   
The difference between the cases of Paint Graphos and Adria-Wien Pipeline is the 
new construction in Paint Graphos, which means that the assessment of selectivity 
is made in the light of the objective pursued by the tax at such. Therefore, the Court 
no longer seems to assess selectivity in the light of favourable tax measure 57, as it 
was laid down in Adria-Wien Pipeline. Nevertheless, it seems that this new con-
struction of ‘the pursued objective’ is up to some point ignored and underestimated 
in the legal literature.58 Many scholars seem to still argue that the selectivity must 
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be assessed under the (old) comparison test. Some scholars claim that selectivity 
requires that the advantage is limited to certain undertakings and thus a measure 
being open to all undertakings would not be regarded as selective.59  
Hence, as said, despite the goal to achieve consensus, the test remains far from 
clear and would need much simplification. The wordings are too unclear and leave 
therefore much space for interpretation. It is obviously not a matter of indifference 
whether the terminology operates with ‘a measure’ or ‘a system’. It is possible that 
these two wordings lead to different outcomes. 
As said, the ECJ has consistently affirmed that the State aid is defined in relation to 
its effects, not its aims or causes, and independently of the technique used. Conse-
quently, the tax measure should therefore be assessed in the light of its effects only, 
and the objectives should be disregarded. But, as noted, in the assessment of the 
selectivity the objective has a role in the examination. The questions thus is how to 
the effect-based analysis when assessing the similar group ‘in the light of the objec-
tive of the tax measure’. 
It must be noted that there is a division in the observation of the objective of a meas-
ure. The Court do have refuted to made the comparison in the light of the external 
objectives of the measure (e.g. environmental), but accepted the comparisons made 
in the light of the internal objectives of the measure (e.g. taxing capital gain, energy 
consumption, tax neutrality). Thus, it seems that the effect-based principle must be 
reconciled with the comparison of the objective of measure in question.60 
The effect-based principle may possibly even overrule the three step analysis. The 
Commission states in its 2016 Notice that it also needed in ‘certain exceptional 
cases’ to examine (in addition to the three-step test) ‘the boundaries of the system’ 
and if the system is designed in ‘a clearly biased way’.61 However, the author thinks 
that this overruling would require a clear intent to use the law for an artificial purpose. 
Despite that ‘the derogation test’ can be seen marginalized on these days, the three-
step test has retained an element of derogation. After the identification of the normal 
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regime in the member state concerned62, it is assessed whether the advantage der-
ogates from that common regime, regarding economic operators who are in a com-
parable legal and factual situation in the light of the objective assigned to the tax 
system of the Member State concerned.63 Although, this derogation is not anymore 
an absolute requisite and not even decisive, as in the case World Duty Free Group 
SA, it has been ruled that ‘it is not always necessary that a tax measure, in order for 
it to be established that it is selective, should derogate from an ordinary tax sys-
tem’.64 
Still, some scholars even see (e.g. Claire Micheau) that despite of the different ter-
minology used when describing selectivity, it is the same test that still applies, and 
that EU law does not carry out two different test, but rather has described the same 
test in two ways.65  
One interpretation also presented is such that the Court shifted its emphasis on 
derogation totally in 2001, and that the shift culminated in 2011 in Gibraltar ruling. 
In that case, the Court held that in certain circumstances there was no need for 
applying the three-step test by the book and to rely on a formalistic derogation as 
long as the measure was designed to have the effect of relieving a certain group of 
companies from being taxed on their corporate profits.66  
5.5. Conferred Tests of Advantage and Selectivity 
There is much confusion among the academics, whether the advantage and selec-
tivity are two separate concepts or whether they exist side by side. Some say that it 
is since Adria-Wien Pipeline, that the confusion has been visible.67 Be as it may, the 
line between these two is blur.  
The author thinks that these two still exists side by side. At first, one must bear in 
mind, that the Article 107(1) TFEU sets four cumulative conditions. This view has 
neither been denied, and it seems that there is a consensus among the academics 
regarding the existence of those four criteria. 
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However, there are strong similarities when assessing the advantage and the se-
lectivity. Both test determine the identifying of two groups, one being the benefited 
taxpayer and the other the reference group, i.e. the ones in the similar situation not 
enjoying the treatment. The starting point in both tests is also the same: it is first 
necessary to identify the benchmark system. 68  
Despite of these obviously strong similarities, the recent Commission Notice on the 
notion of State aid pursuant to the Article 107(1) TFEU explicitly separates these 
two tests. In the 2016 Notice they are divided in two separate sections.69 
Yet, there has been cases in which the demarcation has been missing completely. 
In Gibraltar for example, the question whether an advantage was conferred was not 
answered at all. Instead, it was only examined if there was any selective ad-
vantage.70 Unfortunately, this question has to be left here only as an interesting 
remark. The future may well lead to the point where these two tests are dealt as 
‘selective advantage’. 
5.6. More Categories of Selectivity – De Facto Selectivity 
The ruling in Paint Graphos has been subsequently confirmed, for example in the P 
Oy71 and Navantia72 cases. Nevertheless, it seems that the ECJ no longer uses 
concrete comparisons when assessing selectivity under the three-step test. Instead, 
it can be argued that more abstract selectivity suffices (Paint Graphos, abstract cri-
terion).73 This has obviously widened the scope of State aid and makes the situation 
even more unpredictable. The wider approach of selectivity can also be seen as a 
review of member states’ tax systems, an intervention to internal situations and thus 
to the tax policy in the member states.  
It is based on the settled case law that a measure is not selective alone by the fact 
that it is likely that some economic sectors will benefit more than others. Even so, 
selectivity does not require a clear and explicit distinction between industries in the 
wording of the tax provision.74 
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The concept of selectivity has blurred over the years, and transformed from de jure 
selectivity towards more de facto selectivity, i.e. case-by-case analysis. The Com-
mission handles the concepts of ‘de facto selectivity’ and also ‘indirect selectivity’ in 
its 2016 Notice.75 While de jure selectivity covers any measure under which the 
granting authority limits the tax measure explicitly, by the contrast de facto selectivity 
encompasses measures which do apply to all undertakings, but in practice are only 
available to a limited category of undertakings. 76 In tax matters the concept of de 
facto selectivity is of great importance, because tax measures are often complex 
and selectivity thus results in practise.  
According to the Commission, de facto selectivity typically arises in a situation where 
a measure is generally granted, but these a priori general norms are designed in a 
way that in the end, because of the structure of the measure, the effects benefit only 
certain undertakings.77 
But de facto selectivity analysis can be seen to have reached the whole system. In 
the 2016 Notice, the Commission states, referring to the effect-based principle in 
selectivity, that the three-step analysis cannot always be applied due to the practical 
effects of measure. Therefore, according the Commission ‘[i]t is also necessary to 
evaluate whether the boundaries of the system of reference have been designed in 
a consistent manner or, conversely, in a clearly arbitrary or biased way, so as to 
favour certain undertakings which are in a comparable situation with regard to the 
underlying logic of the system in question.’78 Here the Commission refers to the case 
Gibraltar. In that case indeed the comparability issue stemmed from external, inter-
nationally recognized standards, not from purely internal inconsistencies. Ismer Ro-
land has stated with reference to case Gibraltar, that ‘[t]he internal consistency re-
quirement under the three-step de jure selectivity test would then be complemented 
by an additional external consistency requirement.79 
Before proceeding to the next chapter, the case Navantia will be briefly analysed. 
This case incisively indicates what kind of argumentation and interpretation the ECJ 
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exercises. The case also shows how the effects that result in the practical level are 
analysed.  
The case Navantia concerned a naval defence company, owned totally by the King-
dom of Spain. The company carried out its activity on a shipyard, which was rented 
from its sole shareholder, the Spanish State. The rental price was only symbolic. 
Under the contract terms, Navantia was obliged to assume that all taxes were levied 
on the side of the renter. In Spain, real estate is taxable, but the tax exemptions 
exist when the state holds the real estate itself. In the case, the shipyard was owned 
by the state and thus no property tax was forwarded to the company (Navantia). 
The EJC took the view that the arrangement led to a selective aid, as Navantia 
enjoyed an exemption from property tax. It was imperative that normally private en-
tities pay the property tax when owning land where they carry on their business.80 
The argumentation seems bizarre, as the ‘market economy actor test’ was not im-
plied at all to the Kingdom of Spain. The ECJ also stated that this rental contract 
had not been attacked in the proceedings. Hence, the ECJ left out the contract and 
focused on the taxes and the normal situation.81 The argumentation is interesting 
because the shipyard was owned by the state. Since a state is not an enterprise, 
the Article 107 (1) TFEU should not have applied at all. Neither under the Spanish 
law there was a necessity to transfer the ownership to Navantia. It seems that the 
ECJ was of the opinion, that this arrangement was about exploiting a loophole in 
the tax legislation, thus aiming to reduce the tax burden, and therefore the measure 
was prohibited.82  
6. Definition of collective investment vehicles 
In the previous sections the concept of State aid was examined in its general di-
mension and the main general problems have been adduced. It is now from this 
chapter onwards, that this study focuses on the notion of CIV and its taxation in the 
context of State aid.  
Collective investment vehicle is a general term for a structure whose legal structure 
varies. A CIV may be based on a contract, a trust or it may as well be a company.83 
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An investment through an intermediary (i.e. common investment vehicle (CIV)) is an 
alternative for a direct individual investment. CIV-structure has benefits for the in-
vestors. First of all, it enables that the fees and risks are distributed to a larger pop-
ulation compared to a direct investment. By pooling the assets, the investors can 
also get an access to new market areas. Hence, they will gain more diversification 
to their investments, as some markets they would not have been able to access if 
they invested as private individuals.84 All though, CIV-structure can of course be 











As depicted in the picture, the typical structure for a CIV investment is composed of 
three main levels (or elements). The first element consists of investors, who are 
typically private individuals and who pool their assets to make an investment. The 
CIV is used as the pooling element for this purpose. The third, investment level, to 
which the CIV invests, may consist of any kind of investments, for instance stocks, 
bonds or real estate.85 In this study no separation is made regarding the purpose of 
the investment. 
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Typical elements of a CIV investment are also the (fund) manager and the custo-
dian. The manager initiates the fund and selects the investments, whereas the cus-
todian is the one holding the legal title of the investment. Thus, there may be three 
main operators at the CIV level. Although, a CIV can also have a legal personality 
and be self-managed in such a way that there is neither a separate custodian nor 
the manager is a separate legal person of the CIV.86 
CIVs are typically organized by financial service firms. The organizing firm typically 
serve as a manager for various CIVs which pursue different investment strategies. 
Typically the affiliate of the manager serves as the distributor of the shares (/other 
interests) and the distributor enters into arrangements with other firms that will dis-
tribute the CIV shares or units. However, the distributor may also be an unaffiliated 
firm. CIV shares may be distributed through many distributions channels.87  
The manager is the provider of the services, such as portfolio management (i.e. 
advisory) and transfer agency (shareholder recordkeeping). The manager may also 
select other firms as sub-advisors. The manager (or the sub-advisor) selects the 
investments and makes the decisions on when the assets are bought and sold.88 
There are normally special regimes for collective investments, due to that the normal 
rules would lead to double economic taxation, i.e. taxing the same income twice and 
taxing two different legal persons. The economic double taxation is caused by the 
fact that also the CIVs are regarded as entities for domestic tax purposes.89 Thus, 
without the special regimes, the investors have to pay from the income they receive 
from CIV, as well as the CIV would have to pay corporate tax from its profits.  
6.1. Definition in the Commission Guidelines – Neutrality on the 
Spotlight 
The collective investments are also dealt in a separate section in the 2016 Commis-
sion Notice of State aid.90The definition in the Notice is important, especially in the 
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absence of new case law, although in the risk financing context the matter has been 
dealt.   
The guideline’s definition of collective investment is not limited to the meaning of 
collective investment according to the so called UCITS Directive91. The guidelines 
include also other kind of collective investment entities, such as Alternative Invest-
ment Funds. 92  
Despite of the said, what comes to the establishment, the Commission does refer 
directly to the Article 1(3) of the UCITS Directive and replicates that the common 
investment entity may be constituted contractually (‘as common funds managed by 
management companies), based on trust law (‘as unit trusts’) or under a statute (‘as 
investment companies’).  
In the 2016 Notice, the Commission takes the premise that the investment vehicles 
‘such as undertakings for collective investment’ should be subject to tax, as they 
operate as intermediaries between the investors and the investment. However, the 
guidelines notice the problem of an additional layer between the investor and the 
investment. Therefore, it concludes that without any special regimes, the intermedi-
ary may be treated as a separate taxpayer, which is why the states seek to ensure 
that whatever the vehicle used for the investment, the final tax burden regarding the 
various possibilities of investments would result about to the same.93 
Nevertheless, ‘well-defined’ tax measures which fulfil specific conditions and are 
preferential compared to the other investment vehicles that are in a comparable 
legal and factual situation should be viewed as selective.94 In this regard, the Com-
mission refers to Fineco judgment, which dates back to the year 2009. It is thus 
quite obvious that the overall CIV tax situation remains as the same than what it was 
at the time of the Fineco judgment.  
An example of preferential regime is also mentioned: the situation may be for ex-
ample that three quarters of the assets of the funds are required to be invested in 
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SMEs.95 This clause in the text does not refer to any case. The commission also 
highlights as another example that when the favourable measure omits the EU-har-
monised funds, the treatment should be viewed selective. The EU-harmonised 
funds are named EuVECA96, EuSEF97 and ELTIF98 funds.99 
7. Purpose of Tax Neutrality - Double Tax Elimination in Domestic 
Context 
As the above illustrated, in the CIV context without a specific regime, double eco-
nomical taxation would occur. To avoid this, there are number of various ways to 
remove the double taxation.  
A general purpose is that any taxation should be neutral, which means that the eco-
nomical operators’ decisions and acts should not be affected by taxation, and thus 
resources will be allocated equally within a society. Once the purpose of neutrality 
is achieved, taxation is efficient.100 The tax neutrality principle, as determined by the 
Commission, will be explicated under the chapter of ‘Justification by virtue of tax 
neutrality’. However, the author thinks that it is consistent with the above mentioned 
general determination.  
An integral part of the taxation of CIVs is the elimination of double taxation, in par-
ticular economic double taxation, which means that the same income is taxed 
twice.101 In the CIV context it is possible that the income is taxed at all of the three 
levels. This of course varies between states and depends of the choices taken by 
the legislator. 
In this study the question of international double tax elimination is not dealt at all, 
only the double taxation within a state. This is because of the nature of the State 
aid, as it must be granted through state resources of one state.  
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What comes to the direct taxing of investments which are made through an invest-
ment vehicle, it seems that there are not much phrases in the sources of law regard-
ing the tax neutrality in the CIV area.102 The problem of double taxation and its ad-
vance avoidance seem to have been mainly discussed under the fundamental free-
doms. Hence, one must ask whether the rules adopted under that context could be 
applied analogically to the CIVs in the State aid context. Although, at first must be 
asked that is that case law even relevant for the application of Article 107(1) TFEU, 
since it does not have an equivalent in the fundamental freedoms.103 The author 
here sees the neutrality as a principle and the double tax elimination indeed as two, 
up to some point separate matters, but nevertheless thinks that the tax neutrality 
here is connected to (or categorized to) the double taxation. 
Before examining more precisely the case law, the main techniques used for the 
elimination are briefly described in the following paragraphs. 
The common technique used to eliminate the double taxation is that the taxation is 
eliminated at the level of the CIV. If only the investors remain to be taxed, then the 
situation is the same as it would have been if the investors invested directly to the 
investment, and the purpose of neutrality is achieved.104 
First, the CIV may be exempted for corporate tax purposes. An example from this 
is a Luxembourgian SICAV. (In SICAV context also the question of “exempt the SA 
as per se as legal form” was discussed, but passed over.)105 Secondly, an alterna-
tive is that the CIV is ignored for corporate tax purposes, i.e. characterised as trans-
parent entity, such as a common partnership.106 Third option is that the CIV is enti-
tled to deduct dividend distributions from its taxable basis. Such arrangement is 
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used in the United States for US regulated investment company107 and US real es-
tate investment trust108. Fourthly, the CIV can be taxed at a zero corporate tax 
rate.109  
Essentially, these techniques should eliminate the double economic taxation. How-
ever, there can be a situation in which the eliminating technique is working only 
partially. Such a situation exists for example in Spain, as there the tax per cent is 
reduced, but not a zero.110  
It is also possible that the taxation is removed at the level of the investors, so that 
the taxation is left to the level of CIV. For example, Swiss tax law have adopted this 
regime in certain circumstances.111 The level of investors will be dealt in a later 
chapter. 
In addition to the mid-level and CIV taxation, it is possible that the fund manager is 
also taxed based on the managing fee it receives.  
However, despite of the techniques and their obviously relevant purpose of tax neu-
trality, it is not clear whether the purpose of tax neutrality alone suffices in the State 
aid context. This problem will be examined in the next chapter under the justification 
step of the State aid assessment. It is explicitly through the step of justification how 
the avoidance of double taxation (i.e. tax neutrality) is taken into account. 
8. About justification (Third Phase of Three-Step Test) 
A measure may be prima facie selective, but if the justification condition is met (the 
third step of the three-step assessment test) the aid is allowed in the light of Article 
107(1) TFEU. When ‘a measure derives directly from the intrinsic basic or guiding 
principles of the reference system or where it is the result of inherent mechanisms 
necessary for the functioning and effectiveness of the system’ it is justified.112 The 
same has been depicted in many cases.  
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The burden of proof here lies on the shoulders of Member States. A Member State 
must be able to show that the measure results directly from the basic or guiding 
principles of its tax system.113  
As aforementioned, The ECJ has clarified that the objective pursued by the measure 
is not sufficient to exclude the measure outright from the classification as aid. The 
provision ‘does not distinguish between the causes or the objectives of State aid, 
but defines them in relation to their effects’.114 Therefore, it seems clear, that the 
justification must be derived from the tax-policies taken by the legislator in that mem-
ber state.115 In this regard, also the Commission states in its recent notice, that ‘it is 
not possible to rely on external policy objectives which are not inherent to the sys-
tem.’116  
In Paint Graphos the ECJ added new elements to the selectivity analysis. The Court 
stated that in addition it is also necessary to ensure that the measure is consistent 
regarding ‘the manner in which the tax system is implemented’. According to the 
ECJ, the prima facie selective tax measure can be justified only if it does not go 
beyond what is necessary and if the measure is consistent with the principle of pro-
portionality. The measure meets the condition of necessity if the objective pursued 
could not be attained by less far-reaching measures.117 Paint Graphos was the first 
time, when the ECJ explicitly paid attention to the principle of proportionality when 
assessing selectivity.118 
Selectivity is the opposite of general. Measures of purely general application which 
do not favour certain groups are not under the scope of TFEU 107(1).119 But the 
case law has shown that despite of that, the measure which at first seems general 
may be regarded as selective, as the fact is that some may benefit de facto more 
than others from general measures.  
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8.1. Justification by Virtue of Tax Neutrality  
EU law seem to follow a narrow application of the justification condition. Only certain 
justifications have been accepted in quite a limited number of cases.120 One of the 
justification condition may be the principle of tax neutrality. With regard to that, the 
Commission refers explicitly to the common investment vehicles in its 2016 No-
tice.121 In addition, the basis may be the need to avoid double taxation.122 As afore-
mentioned, these concepts in this study are regarded as such a way that double 
taxation rules out the tax neutrality. 
According to the 2016 Notice of Commission, once the measure has a purpose to 
ensure the tax neutrality, it should not be regarded as constituting prohibited State 
aid. Such regimes may thus reduce or demolish the double economic taxation ‘in 
accordance with the overall principles inherent to the tax system in question’. Nev-
ertheless, the Commission refers to the Fineco –case and clarifies that the measure 
nevertheless should not have ‘the effect of favouring certain undertakings for col-
lective investment or certain types of investments’.123 The case Fineco will be stud-
ied later on in this study.  
However, as it will be provided in the following sections, it is still far from clear where 
the borderline lies in the justification on the basis of neutrality, as it still seems that 
the purpose of neutrality itself may not suffice for the justification. What blurs the 
situation here on top of that is the fact that the issue of taxing possibly all the three 
levels in CIV has often been investigated in the risk financing context. Yet, in risk 
financing there is an additional justification element, as the Article 107(3) TFEU may 
justify the measure.  
At least, the definition of tax neutrality is laid down in a clear and coherent manner 
in the 2016 Notice. According to that, the neutrality means that the taxpayers are 
treated in a similar way, regardless of whether they invest directly or indirectly in the 
assets. In consequence, the Commission concludes that the tax scheme applied to 
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the entities that are acting as common investment vehicles and fiscal transparent, 
could be justified by the tax measures inherent to the tax scheme, ’provided that the 
prevention of double economic taxation constitutes a principle inherent to the tax 
system in question’. 124 The author wants to point out the term used, ‘fiscal transpar-
ent’, as it is possible, and even likely, that this term itself may be understood and 
interpreted in various ways.  
Yet, the Commission clears up, that the tax neutrality nonetheless does not mean 
that ‘the investment vehicles should be entirely exempted from any taxes’. Either it 
does not mean that the fund managers should be exempted from the tax regarding 
the fee that they charge from the managing of the funds.125 The neutrality principle 
also applies only to the fund capital, neither to the management companies’ own 
capital nor revenues. With this regard, the Commission refers to the logic of the 
Decision of the EFTA Surveillance Authority of 18 March 2009 with regard to the 
taxation of investment undertakings in Lichtenstein. That case will be examined 
more closely in the next chapter. 
The Commission also refers to the Finnish REIT Case126 and concludes that neither 
does the principle of neutrality justify the more favourable treatment of common in-
vestments compared to the individual investments.127  
8.1.1. The EFTA Decision of 18 March 2009  
The Commission referred to the logic of neutrality expressed in this case in its 2016 
Notice.128 According to the Commission, ’[t]he logic of neutrality behind the special 
taxation of investment undertakings applies to the fund capital, but not to the man-
agement companies' own revenues and capital.’129 The reasoning sounds logical, 
as there is a fundamental difference between these two. The fund capital is a re-
source from the investors and is to be invested to the investment object. The fund 
capital is thus just a temporary part of the transferring intermediary’s total capital.  
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Before examining the neutrality logic, the case will be briefly summed up. The case 
examined a situation in Liechtenstein where the investment companies did neither 
pay any income nor coupon tax, but only reduced capital tax on their own assets.130 
The Court compared the investment to ‘the other undertakings, in particular towards 
the fund direction of investment funds who were subject to ordinary taxation on rev-
enues from their business activities’.131 The wording expressed in such a way indi-
cates that the comparable group nevertheless was not strictly limited only to the 
investment funds.  
Supposedly, the Authorities did not keep relevant the point which Liechtenstein au-
thorities pointed out, that undertakings are free to choose their form. The EFTA 
Court referred to the already settled principle in EU case law, that a measure ‘cannot 
be attributed a general character just because it could be used by any interested 
undertaking […]’.132 Here thus a reference to EU case law was made.133 
The advantage was concluded to be selective and the form how the investment 
undertakings were organized was the decisive factor. The EFTA Court stated that: 
‘Investment companies are legal entities incorporated under Liechten-
stein law in the form of companies limited by shares which gain reve-
nues from the management of placements by investors and dispose 
of capital’.134 
The neutrality logic then was expressed in the following way (referred in its totality): 
‘The tax relief for the management’s own assets falls neither within the 
logic of the general tax system in Liechtenstein, nor within the logic of 
the taxation of investment undertakings as such. The Liechtenstein 
taxation rules and taxation practice shows that the logic behind the 
special taxation of investment undertakings applies to the fund capital, 
but not to the management companies’ own assets. Indeed, the fund 
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direction of the investment funds has always been subject to ordinary 
business taxation for its own revenues and own capital.’ 
According to the conclusion of the Authority, there was ‘nothing in the organizational 
form of investment companies’ which could be regarded as justification for the ben-
eficial treatment, when compared to the management activities of an investment 
fund. Both must also keep separated the assets of the investors from their own as-
sets.135 Therefore, here apparently lies the link to the Commission 2016 Notice (foot-
note 245). By virtue of tax neutrality is not possible to justify such beneficial treat-
ment of companies.  
No clear argumentation of the neutrality issue in particular was nevertheless ex-
pressed and any word referring literally to neutrality was not used. The issue was 
discussed in general terms ‘logic of general tax system’ and ‘logic of the taxation of 
investment undertakings’. However, either the Commission did not refer directly to 
a certain page or paragraph, only to the case in general. Additionally, the author did 
not face any legal writings referring expressly to the case and its neutrality logic. As 
aforementioned, neither are much academics writings written on the justification by 
virtue of tax neutrality.   
9. Risk Finance Guidelines136 and CIV – Another Justifying Ele-
ment 
The CIV may be constructed in a context where the tax measure has a specific 
purpose of incentive. Especially lately, the case law in the CIV context seem to have 
been mainly investigated under the risk finance tax measures. The many cases that 
are referred in this study exemplify that. The author thinks that it is due to the fun-
damental structure or nature of risk financing, which is often organized it often in-
volves an intermediary vehicle. It is not common that the private investors them-
selves would invest directly to such an uncertain investment. 
Thus, also the risk finance guidelines deal with the scope of this study. The reason 
why the cases regarding the risk finance concept are now dealt up to a certain point 
within this study is that the risk finance context often deals with the same kind of 
basic dilemma: there is a risk of State aid arising at the three different levels (the 
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investors, the intermediary vehicle and the investment) 137. However, due to that the 
private investors themselves cannot be regarded as the recipients of State aid, this 
‘occurring at three levels’ is actually a bit misleading.  
The Commission issued ‘Guidelines on State aid to promote risk finance invest-
ments’ (RFGs) in 2014. It was regarded that the small- and mid-cap companies 
are facing difficulties to access financing, and it was thought that the public 
measures might evolve the overall situation in the markets.138  
The legal basis, is in the Article 107(3) TFEU, which gives to the Commission the 
power to accept measures designed to facilitate certain economic activities, which 
prima facie constitute State aid.139 Therefore, when the tax measure concerns risk 
financing, there is an additional judicial basis that may justify the measure. Hence, 
the situation is different compared to the so called ‘normal CIV-structure, by which 
the author means that there is not any specific economical purpose in the designing, 
but where the purpose of the measure, as stated in this study, is the tax neutrality 
itself. Thus, the difference here ensues from the last level of the CIV-structure, (i.e. 
the investment level).   
Notwithstanding, the author sees the structure of CIV fundamentally in such a way, 
that despite of the context, and hence also in the risk financing, the CIV structure 
always requires that the tax neutrality is obtained. Here the neutrality is threated 
especially if the same income is taxed twice. No matter what the actual object of 
investment. Otherwise, the measure is not efficient. It is just here, that there is this 
additional element: the purpose of facilitating financing, which may by itself justify 
the beneficial treatment on the basis of the Article 107(3) TFEU. The author has not 
confronted to such an argumentation that there could be a situation where there was 
more than one justification condition which was weighed or that they should be 
weighed against another. Therefore, it seems that the Article 107(3) weighs more 
than the argumentation under the Article 107(1).  
Because of this difference in the investment object, the argumentation used in the 
case law which examines CIV, but in the context of risk financing, can be applied to 
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the so called general CIV structure only up to a certain degree. Yet, here lies again 
one of the Achilles heel regarding the area of this study. When studying the common 
investment structure one must bear in mind that this structure itself (when talking in 
general and from a simplified view) is used in a many different kind of contexts, 
especially when talking from the viewpoint of the investment.  
The Commission points out that it applies the principles set out in the Risk Finance 
Guidelines ‘only in the risk finance schemes’.140 Consequently, principles set out in 
that context apply certainly only in the CIV context and when the investment fulfils 
the condition of risk financing. Even so, it is hard to believe that in a similar context, 
but where a risk financing is not the investment objective of measure, the view would 
be radically different. Further, the recent case law deals only with risk financing is-
sues. For this reason, the arguments may be used at least for analogical interpreta-
tion.  
What comes to the substantial aspects dealt in the RFGs, especially the question of 
only ‘a mere vehicle’ is dealt. According to the RFGs, in general the Commission 
considers ‘a financial intermediary only as a vehicle for the transfer of aid to inves-
tors in which the investment is made, rather than a beneficiary of aid’. Nevertheless, 
when the aid ‘measure involves a direct transfer to the intermediary or when the 
measure requires a co-investment, it may constitute State aid, if the same would not 
be accepted to a normal economic operator’.141 The same has been also expressed 
in the 2016 Notice, although with a bit different wording. In the 2016 Notice it was 
stated that ‘[i]n case’ the intermediary is ‘a mere vehicle’, ‘[...] it should not normally 
be considered as a recipient of State aid.’142 Here it is noticeable that the Commis-
sion does not refer to any case law. 
The purpose of facilitating access to financing itself does not automatically lead to 
a justification. The RFGs provide that ‘certain categories of schemes may be subject 
to an evaluation, in order to further ensure that distortions of competition and trade 
are limited’.143 
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The Commission points out that if the State aid occurs at all the first two levels 
(investor and the intermediary) the target company will receive at least partial State 
aid. Despite of the possible pure economical reason behind.144 Thus, at least in the 
Risk Financing context it seems quite obvious that because the indirect beneficiary 
concept it will automatically follow that the target company is also a beneficiary. The 
concept of indirect advantage and selectivity will be dealt in detail in the later chap-
ters. 
10. Case Law (and Lack of It) in CIV Context 
10.1. Fineco - Indirect Advantage 
This case is one of the most important rulings of the Court when determining what 
constitutes State aid in the CIV context. Mainly so, because of the small amount of 
case law in the field. Interestingly, there are neither much references to this case in 
the legal literature.  
In Fineco the measure constituted illegal State aid and was therefore recovered. 
The measure in question was a tax scheme implemented by Italy for specialised 
investment vehicles. Fineco Asset Management SpA was the asset management 
undertaking, which managed two funds specialized in small- and mid-caps. Its legal 
structure was a company limited by shares.  
The measure in question amended the tax treatment of certain undertakings for col-
lective investment in transferable securities, which were specialised in shares in 
small- and medium-capitalisation companies listed on a regulated market of the Eu-
ropean Union. According to the measure, the capital revenue accruing to the spe-
cialised investment vehicles (after certain conditions were fulfilled145) were subject 
to the corporation tax of 5 %, instead of the standard corporate tax of 12.5 %. The 
reduced normal rate of 5 % substitute tax was also applied to the capital revenue 
accruing to Italian non-specialised investment vehicles that invest in Italian special-
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ised investment vehicles, for the part that their income derives from Italian special-
ised investment vehicles.146 Similar mechanism applied to pension funds which in-
vested to special investment funds.147 
The question of locus standi was not certain. Fineco Asset Management SpA man-
aged two of the three common funds specialised in small- and mid-caps which have 
benefited from the tax measure.148 The Court argued that ‘[…] because the State 
aid decision is addressed to the state concerned it is needed to be examined 
whether the measure has of direct and individual concern. Alone that the applicant 
belongs to the sector to which the measure is addressed may not suffice. However, 
the Court stated that Fineco Asset Management SpA was the actual beneficiary of 
the aid, the recovery ordered, and therefore the decision of individual concern to it. 
It was also stated, that the decision was of direct concern.149  
The selectivity then was assessed in relation to the CIVs or (and to the managing 
companies) and in relation to the small- and mid-caps whose shares were held by 
CIVs.150 What was interesting in this decision was how the measure was categorised 
as State aid in relation to its indirect beneficiaries, who according to the Commission 
and the Court were specialised investment vehicles, their managing companies and 
small- and mid-caps. It is notable that the Commission did not find in its argument 
that the investors were the direct beneficiaries of the measure, while the Court 
thought that it was ‘apparent’. The Court went on and stated that the Commission 
nevertheless did not ‘err in law’ although it assessed the measure in relation to its 
indirect beneficiaries151. Despite this difference, the private investors could not have 
been regarded as recipients of aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. 
It was after this argument when the Court noted that it must be looked into whether 
the indirect beneficiaries are ‘undertakings’. The attention was paid on the two-sided 
fact that the investment vehicles themselves may be companies and thus can ben-
efit themselves from the advantage. On the opposite, the investment vehicles may 
lack the legal personality, but are nonetheless managed by (other) companies.152 It 
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was consequently laid down by the Court, that despite of the specialised investment 
vehicles being ‘mere pools of assets lacking the legal personality […] the undertak-
ings which manage them’ are the ones that benefit, although indirectly. Conse-
quently, it was concluded that the measure in questions favoured the undertak-
ings.153  
The Court also noted that the selectivity criteria regarding the vehicles that lack the 
legal personality is nevertheless met when their ‘status as undertakings is not dis-
puted’, and refers to the Adria-Wien Pipeline case law.154 What the Court actually 
meant by that is not fully clear. The author sees that this comment indicated some 
kind of continuity, i.e. a comparison to the already existing and settled case law at 
that moment, and that according to the Court, the argumentation in Fineco was not 
much different from that.  
In this Italian case, the measure in question was described as State aid scheme, 
why the Court stated that it was thus not necessary to examine each particular case, 
but it was sufficient that the measure benefits certain undertakings.  State aid was 
not excluded ‘[…] by the fact that it may also benefit entities which are not under-
takings’. It is thus adequate for the Commission to show that in certain cases the 
investment vehicles are undertakings and ‘the Commission could legitimately con-
fine itself to examining the general characteristics of the measure’.155 Any different 
argumentation would have been impossible in this regard, as it is necessary for the 
functioning of the TFEU 107(1) to work in a situation where both undertakings and 
mere pool of assets without legal personality at the same time may benefit from the 
measure. It would also be impossible to show that each case under a particular 
scheme is against the Article TFEU 107(1). 
Selective advantage in favour of the specialised investment vehicles or of the un-
dertakings which manage them exists, according to the Court, even if the measures 
are not subsidies ‘in the strict sense’, but if they ‘mitigate the charges which are 
normally born in the budget of an undertaking’, if the measure has the same effect 
and are similar in character as subsidies.156 This finding was not a new argument. 
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What was indeed regarded as constituting the indirect advantage to the intermediary 
vehicle, was that the tax reduction ‘prompts investors to buy shares in such vehicles, 
thereby providing additional liquidity and extra income in terms of management and 
entry fees’. Thus, the investment vehicle received an advantage; increased demand 
of their shares.157 The measure at issue were described as ‘selective also in respect 
of managing undertakings of specialised investment vehicles, when they lack the 
legal personality.’ The managing companies were regarded as being the indirect 
beneficiaries in such a situation.158  
The selectivity was assessed also in relation to the small- and mid-caps whose 
shares were held by the investment vehicles. The Court concluded that the measure 
concluded an indirect advantage for those companies, as the measure increased 
the demand of their shares.159 
Also, a situation where an already received advantage may be cancelled out was 
dealt. The Court noted that this fact does not solely mean that the advantage could 
not be regarded as selective. What is sufficient for fulfilling the condition of favouring, 
is that the measure increases the demand of shares, ‘hence the management and 
entry fees charged by those vehicles or by the undertakings managing them’.160 
The measure in Fineco was selective because the measure was regarded as limited 
to the specialised investment vehicles and their managing undertakings ‘to the det-
riment of other undertakings offering alternative forms’. The fact that all investment 
vehicles which fulfil the laid conditions can benefit from the measure has no effect 
to selectivity.161   
The comparable group was determined vastly, as ‘the undertakings offering alter-
native forms’ is quite the most open phrase which can be used as a standard of 
comparison. Here the word used was ‘undertaking’, which raises another general 
question, one which has already been expressed in the academic literature. Is the 
comparison in CIV context in general and in practise required to be made to other 
investment funds or to the other companies?162 
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It was concluded that ‘no arguments have been presented by the plaintiff’, that the 
situation of collective investments in small- and mid-caps could not be compared to 
the investments in other companies or even that of individual investments’. The 
comparison between small- and mid-caps and the large-capitalisation companies 
was not considered to be precluded solely by the fact that large-capitalisation com-
panies’ capitalization is ‘considerable’ and, as the sole fact that they are already 
heavily present on the markets.163 Thus, also the standard of comparison with re-
gard to the small-and mid-caps was vast, but more fixed than it was on the invest-
ment vehicle. Here, it was coherent that the comparable factor was a group of com-
panies.  
The Court also repeated its previous ruling, that a measure that allows an undertak-
ing to increase their own resources on more favourable terms may itself constitute 
State aid. A mere increase in liquidity can therefore constitute a prohibited ad-
vantage.164 
The measure’s objective (diversifying the portfolios of investors) was neither a suf-
ficient justifying factor. The Court confirmed the already settled case law that ‘the 
objective pursed by the measure cannot enable it to escape being’ State aid. The 
Court based its argument on efficiency, and that if such an objective would be re-
garded as justifying, the Article 107(1) (ex. 87(1) EC) would lose its effect.165 The 
author agrees with this argumentation, because if the objective of measure could 
justify it, this could lead to a justified situation in almost every case.  
However, another question remained, as how such a factors as ‘increase’ can and 
should be assessed coherently (being it economic benefit or more precisely the in-
crease in demand)? In the argumentation of the Court, this question did not receive 
much attention. It was mainly passed extensively, with some phrases consisting of 
elements such as ‘increased demand for their shares’ and ‘increased liquidity owing 
to the enhanced attractiveness of the investment’166. The Commission stated in its 
initiation decision that ‘by increasing their after-tax income, it favoured demand on 
the part of investors for shares in those vehicles’.167 Therefore, it seems that it may 
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even be sufficient that the demand is only theoretically foreseeable, i.e. that the 
increase can be clearly assumed.  
10.1.1. Fineco Conclusions  
Fineco acknowledged that even though the advantage is granted directly to certain 
natural or legal persons who are not undertakings, the State aid may be constituted 
on the indirect recipient of the State aid who then is an undertaking. In Fineco, the 
increase in demand was one of the decisive factors.  
In Fineco the question of risk financing was not on the spotlight, which is due to the 
objective of the measure, as it was to diversify the portfolios of investors. Assoges-
tioni indeed challenged the Commission by that ‘the measure at issue aims to foster 
the capitalisation […]’168. Another kind of argumentation by Assogestioni may have 
led to another kind of result. 
The plaintiff side did not either refer to the justification by virtue of tax neutrality, 
which is why the Court was not able to express any arguments on that basis. The 
question nevertheless arises what if the parties would have appealed that the pur-
pose of the measure was to ensure tax neutrality, would the measure have been 
justified then on the basis of Article 107(1) TFEU? Assumingly, in this current con-
text, tax neutrality would not have overruled the selectivity. In the end, the justifica-
tion analysis is counterweighing against the selectivity analysis, and thus a kind of 
value weighing.   
10.2. Commission Decision 2010 on the Residential Real Estate Invest-
ment Trust (REIT) Tax Scheme in Finland  
The following is a REIT tax scheme case. In the legal literature there is often made 
a dichotomy between the CIVs and the REITs, and the concepts are dealt sepa-
rately. However, in general, the fundamental difference is not that remarkable that 
it would require that the REIT scheme should be excluded from this study.  
The general structure of REIT can be described in general terms similarly as CIV’s. 
(The author refers to the CIV determination in this study). The essential difference 
                                                 




between CIV and REIT is at investment objective. REITs are also common or pooled 
investments, investing in the real estate property.169  
The following case is a Finnish one, in which the Commission accepted the tax ex-
emptions for the Finnish Real estate investment trusts. The measure here tackled 
the double taxation at the intermediary level.  
The measure concerned was ‘Act on the Tax Exemption of Certain Limited Compa-
nies engaged in rental housing markets’ which authorized the creation of Real Es-
tate Investment trusts (REITs). REIT under this act had a form of Limited Liability 
Company and is exempted from corporate tax after certain requisites are fulfilled.170 
The objective of the measure was to ‘encourage investment in the rental housing 
market in Finland so as to increase the supply of affordable rental accommodation’. 
It was stated, that in certain areas in Finland the demand for smaller ‘rental dwell-
ings’ significantly exceeds the supply of affordable accommodations. To achieve the 
objective, the elimination of double taxation in the REIT structure, at the level of the 
trust, was considered to be the most important obstacle to tackle.171 Although the 
decision text does not refer to the tax neutrality directly, it is obvious that the actual 
purpose of the measure was indeed the tax neutrality (i.e. remove tackle the eco-
nomic double taxation). The decision text for its part indicates this clearly.   
According to the decision text and the chapter ‘1. Description of the measure’, ‘[a] 
key characteristic of REIT is that it is exempted from corporate income taxation and 
the requirement of immediate distribution of profits to the shareholders’. In addition, 
the ‘principle behind’ was that the investment is comparable to a direct investment, 
i.e. ‘investors can invest in a portfolio […] as if they owned them directly’.172 Here 
again, the words used for describing the measure prove that the tax neutrality ob-
jective is strongly part of the argumentation. The author points out, that compared 
to the other cases, the principle of neutrality, is not often this clearly referred (here: 
‘principle behind’.) 
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The requisites was laid down quite in detail. First, only public limited companies 
registered as a REIT could benefit from the measure and the operational area was 
limited to cover only ‘rental property activities’. In addition, The REIT is required to 
distribute as dividends at least 90 % of its profits to shareholders, although a certain 
amount was allowed to retain as a means to be investment later in new rentals. 
(Last condition changed due to the Commission requirement). REIT either ‘cannot 
carry out construction business, but may act as a developer for its own behalf’. In 
addition, the measure included rules of the minimum share of rental income, asset 
structure, the minimum period of ownership and maximum shareholding requi-
sites.173174 Here the minute requirement specification must have played a role in the 
Commission decision, facilitating the determination of the State aid recipients, and 
consequently the comparison group.  
The Commission compared the situation to a situation where a transparent entity 
(such as Finnish limited partnership) or individual investors invest directly to a real 
estate. The Commission argued that in this context, there exists a reasonable de-
mand to set the REIT to a similar position.175 In this situation, only the investor level 
and the distributed profit are always taxed. Once again in an argumentation, which 
is clearly tax neutrality reasoning. One is left wondering, why it is so that more spe-
cific determination, of neutrality seem to be avoided in this case also. Although, it is 
so, that the argumentation rules, not a single term. Yet, clear argumentation requires 
determinations. 
The measure was justified according to the last phase of the three-step test, i.e. 
based on the ‘nature or general scheme of the Finnish tax system.’176 The author 
sees the logic of this case in such a way, that the neutrality logic did indeed have a 
role in the justification, although not clearly referred or determined. In the written 
argumentation however, the purpose of the measure indeed related to the objective, 
which was to increase the amount of rental dwellings in Finland.  
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It seems that the scope of REIT was so clearly limited, i.e. investments only to rental 
housing and land lording of rental housing, de minimis assets, were determined, 
that it resulted to a situation where no comparison could not be made. The Com-
mission thus determined the comparison group to be ‘other public limited compa-
nies’ meaning that it did not find any selective difference in the treatment. Further, it 
specified that ‘[i]n particular, public limited companies not being tax transparent are 
in a legal and factual situation that is not comparable to that of a REIT.177 Thus, the 
Commission expressed that such limited liability companies which are not taxably 
transparent, cannot be compared to REITs. 
10.3. The Walloon CIW-Regime178 - Reduction in Personal Income Tax 
When the situation remains that there are not new case law after Fineco, focusing 
on the subject of this research area, in order to answer thoroughly to the question 
of ‘what constitutes the border between prohibited and accepted’, an enquire must 
be done to the case law where it at first glance seems that it is a State aid case, but 
nevertheless the case has not been examined as a State aid case.  
A tax measure of this kind was the Belgian Walloon CIW-regime, which concerned 
a tax reduction at the level of private individuals. In 2009 a Walloon region legislator 
implemented a tax reduction for individuals buying shares or bonds in a specific 
public investment fund, the ‘Caisse d’Investissement de Wallonie.’179 The measure 
had a purpose to increase investments in SMEs not noted on the stock exchange. 
Consequently, the CIW was only allowed to invest in such enterprises.180 The re-
duction was conditional, one requirement being that the individual investing to the 
CIW is a resident of the Walloon region.181  
The Commission started investigations and it did focus on the questions of State aid 
at first, but nevertheless made a conclusion that the CIW-regime is discriminatory 
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and infringes the free movement of workers (Article 45 TFEU). This was due to that 
the reduction was only available to the residents of Walloon region. The residency 
was applied strictly, as not even the individuals that earned a part or all of their 
income from the region were allowed to the reduction.182 
The Commission thus formally requested Belgium to amend the law at issue.183 The 
Walloon legislator nonetheless did not take any actions regarding the requirement. 
So, the Commission referred the case to the Court of Justice.184 However, Belgium 
eventually did change the legislation in question, and the case was closed before 
the procedure.185 
The Commission did neither consider this case as an infringement to the free move-
ment of capital. Even though, it is apparent that (also here) the capital investments 
should qualify as capital in the sense of the TFEU 63. In the academic writings, it 
was noted that this might have been due to the fact that the infringement of free 
movement of capital was less obvious in the case, taking into account the fact that 
the regime was implemented by the regional sub-authority, not by the federal au-
thorities.186 
In addition, neither was the CIW-reduction regarded as State aid. The Commission 
stated, that in order the measure to constitute State aid, the regimes need to provide 
for a tax benefit to undertakings.187  
It thus seems, that the Commission did totally ignore the concept of indirect benefi-
ciaries.  The Commission seem to have considered the measure only in relation to 
its direct beneficiaries, i.e. private individuals. Thus, totally overriding the already 
concluded concept, and the ECJ’s case law dealing with different levels of recipi-
ents/beneficiaries. From the author’s point of view, it is clear that the CIW qualifies 
as an undertaking. 
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In the academic literature, it has also been seen that the CIW-regime did indeed 
infringe also State aid law.188 Consequently, this kind of legal interpretation awakes 
a question whether the combined application of fundamental freedoms and State 
aid is a possible approach, or whether either one of these two overrules.  
11. Investors and Subsequent Levels – Question of Indirectness 
11.1. The Level of Investors 
When tax concessions are granted to private individuals to encourage them to invest 
in certain companies or certain specific investment funds, it is unlikely that such 
schemes would be concerned as prohibited. Above all, to be prohibited according 
to the Article 107(1) TFEU, the individuals should qualify as ‘undertakings’.  
To be concerned as undertakings, the private individuals would need to be ‘engaged 
in an economic activity’ which according to the settled case law means that the ac-
tivity consists of ‘offering goods and services on a market’.189 In case of private in-
dividuals, this requisite seems such would fulfil only in exceptional situation. How-
ever, there is still a possibility, as the undertaking status is not tied up to a legal 
status.190 
In an Italian case Incentivi fiscali all’investimento, a measure concerned individuals 
in such a way, that the investors liable for personal income tax could deduct from 
their gross income tax an amount equal to 19 % of their invested capital, a maximum 
investment amount not exceeding EUR 500 000 per tax year. Where the deduction 
amounted to a greater amount than the gross tax, the excess could be deducted in 
the subsequent years. The measure however had limitations regarding investors, 
among others, that the ‘[…] indirect investments made through collective investment 
undertakings and other capital companies that are directly or indirectly publicly 
owned’.191  
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The Commission found that the measure was selective at the private investor level. 
It was concluded, that ‘where a measure allows private investors to make invest-
ments on more favourable terms than the public investors, or than if they had un-
dertaken such investments in the absence of the measure, then those private inves-
tors will be considered to receive an advantage.’192 Despite of that, it was decided 
that the Article 107(1) TFEU applies only where an advantage is conferred on an 
undertaking. Consequently, the measure did not constitute State aid within the 
meaning of TFEU 107(1) to ‘natural persons without any registered business activ-
ities’.193  
Yet, alone the fact that the measure does not constitute State aid at the investor 
level, does not indicate that it would not constitute State aid at all, as it may be 
prohibited at the level of investment vehicle or at the level of beneficiary undertak-
ings.194 Thus, the following sections focus on the subsequent levels, where the fo-
cus is on the concept of indirectness. 
11.2. Indirect Advantage and Indirect Beneficiary  
11.2.1. Indirect advantage in Commission Notice 
The most important concept to take into account when imposing tax measures which 
relate to CIV concept, is the concept of indirect beneficiary.  
According to the Commission 2016 Notice, which remains the latest summary 
source on the matter, the aid ‘can be conferred on undertakings other than the un-
dertakings to which the aid is directly transferred’. The situation can also be such 
that the other undertaking receives the aid directly and the other indirectly. For ex-
ample, it may be that there is an intermediary company who receives the indirect 
advantage, as it is operating in a subsequent level. Although, if it is a mere vehicle, 
it should not be considered as receiving any advantage, according to the Notice. 
What must be noted is that there is no requirement that the direct recipient should 
be engaged in economic activity. The direct recipient can be either natural or legal 
person.195  
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The indirect advantages must be distinguished from ‘mere secondary economic ef-
fects’, which according the Commission 2016 Notice are inherent in almost all State 
aid measures. Example used by the Commission is increase in output. An indirect 
advantage however occurs if due to the designation of the measure, its secondary 
effects are channelled to identifiable undertakings.196 
Regardless of the said, if the intermediary is ‘a mere vehicle’, it should not normally 
be considered as a recipient of a State aid.197 But the concept of ‘mere vehicle’ is 
not a clear one. It can also be read from the Notice, that there can be derogations 
in which the intermediary is indeed the beneficiary (i.e. the recipient of the State 
aid).  
The questions of indirect beneficiary will be dealt in the following sections, which 
deal with the relevant case law.  
11.3. Commission Decision MoraKG  
In the German aid scheme MoraKG198, which concerned general conditions for cap-
ital investments, it was regarded that the income tax benefit to private individuals 
constituted indirect State aid to selected group of enterprises, i.e. target enterprises 
(later called TE). 
The scheme consisted of three measures which were incorporated into the Bill to 
Modernise the General Conditions for Capital Investments. All the three measures 
shared a goal of facilitating the provision of private venture capital to a specific group 
of companies (TE). The third measure concerned taxation, under which the private 
investors investing into the TEs were entitled to income tax benefits in the case of 
capital gains on divestures.199  
The case is especially interesting for the reason that here the Commission chal-
lenged the compatibility of the risk capital guidelines.200 The reason for the ques-
tioning was that the Risk Capital Guidelines provide that State aid in the form of risk 
capital cannot be granted among others to large enterprises [...]’201. Hence, also the 
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large enterprises could benefit from the measure. This case thus indicates the bor-
derline when the Article 107(3) and the justification by virtue of the risk financing 
applies. The reasoning of this kind indicates that the measure may be justified only 
if it is demarcated in a way that it is available only to the target group, which must 
exclude large enterprises.  
The measure called ‘MoRaKG’ aimed to encourage private investors to invest in 
TEs by offering tax advantages for the profits derived from their investment.202 It 
was noted that the measure would only have a limited effect, as the amount of taxes 
saved by the private individuals as due to the measure is quite small, and the benefit 
granted only in the event of successful exit. Hence, the distortive effect between the 
target enterprises and non-target enterprises would be limited. 203 The Commission 
did state that ‘it is extremely difficult to precisely quantify the advantage that TEs will 
receive ex ante’. Here the wording ‘extremely difficult’ is notable, because the Com-
mission could have thought that it is unlikely that the target enterprises actually re-
ceive any remarkable benefit. Nevertheless, it was regarded that the income tax 
benefit is selective and indirectly favours the companies (TE level) and conse-
quently constitutes indirect State aid to the TEs.204  
The Commission concluded that the income tax benefit measure is not compatible 
with the Risk Capital Guidelines.205 Pretty much none of the requirements of Risk 
Capital Guidelines were met. The essential part seemed to be that the measure 
could benefit also the large enterprises, but in addition there was not either ‘any 
evidence of a particular market failure affecting TEs’ which then could have 
launched the more detailed assessment.206 
Interestingly, the Commission did see some sense in the measure, as it finally ruled 
that the measure may be adjusted to the Risk Capital Guidelines under the condi-
tions it laid.207 First, the definition of TE should be limited only to SMEs and it must 
exclude the other groups which are not under the Risk Capital Guidelines (i.e. ship-
building, coal and steel industry.)  Additionally, the maximum investment tranches 
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were laid down, but no special legal requisite for the legal form was required from 
the TE. Further, Germany must ensure the compatibility of the measures with the 
Risk Capital Guidelines regarding the reporting and cumulation rules.208 
11.4. Commission Decision Dispositif ISF-PME – Tax Reduction for 
Private Individuals  
The case Dispositif ISF-PME209 is an example of a situation where the tax scheme 
was eventually accepted after an investigation. The case concerned a tax scheme 
aimed to facilitate investments in innovative SMEs (i.e. PME). The measure granted 
a tax reduction to private individuals from the wealth tax (impot de solidarité sur la 
fortune) who subscribed to the capital of innovative SMEs either by way of mutual 
funds for innovation (fonds communs de placement dans l'innovation, FCPI) or local 
investment funds (fonds d'investissements de proximité, FIP)’.210 
ISF-PME measure, open only to private individuals, offered a reduction of 50 % of 
the wealth tax.211 The Commission argued that the Article 107(1) TFEU does not 
apply to private individuals. Therefore, as only the private investors may benefit from 
the measure, it is not State aid in the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.212  
In Dispositif ISF-PME the Commission considered that the financial intermediary is 
a structure with the purpose of transferring the aid, rather than a beneficiary of aid 
in its own right, irrespective of whether the intermediary has a legal status, or that 
the intermediary is merely a bundle of assets managed by a management company. 
However, the Commission did state, in quite general phrase, that it is nevertheless 
possible that a measure involving direct transfers in favor of the intermediary, or 
measures involving a co-investment, may constitute State aid, unless they are made 
under such terms which would be acceptable to a normal economic operator. Not-
withstanding, it was concluded that there was not such direct transfers of aid in favor 
of the funds and that the fiscal advantage benefits only the private investors.213 
Thus, the Commission took the view that the intermediary is a mere vehicle. 
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Despite of that, the SMEs were regarded as the beneficiaries, and the received ben-
efit as a selective advantage, as they were the only recipients of aid. The fiscal 
measure lead to a situation where the SMEs possibilities to access financing is fa-
cilitated, which then, according to the Commission, creates them an indirect ad-
vantage.214  
Eventually, the measure was justified based on the Article 107(3) point c.215 The 
Article 107(3) c justifies ‘aid [which aim] is to facilitate the development of certain 
economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid does not adversely 
affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest’. 
It is interesting that compared to the case Fineco216, in which both the SMEs as well 
as the intermediary vehicle were regarded as indirect beneficiaries, in the both 
cases the aim was the same: to promote the investments in SMEs and to thus in-
crease the market value of SMEs. However, in Fineco, the fact how the tax neutrality 
was constructed to be achieved was different, as the double taxation was demol-
ished at the level of the investment vehicle. Neither was the Article 107 (3) even 
dealt in Fineco. 
11.5. Conclusions  
The above depicted case law provides that the application of State aid cannot be 
circumvented by granting the tax measure to private investors, which are outside 
the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.  
In reference to the aforementioned case law, the general rule seems to be that the 
intermediary is only a vehicle used for the transfer of aid. This general rule applies 
especially when the intermediary has been set up only as a transferring element.  
However, the Commission has stated that the alongside co-investment(s) may 
change the situation, among other case law, also in Dispositif ISF-PME.217 In such 
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a situation, the decisive factor seems to be whether the investment is made under 
normal market terms.218 219 
Thus the ‘mere vehicle’ approach seem to be related to the way how the intermedi-
ary has been constructed and whether it is a co-investor. To ensure, that no aid is 
constituted at the intermediary level, it seems that aid measure must be arranged 
legally in such a way that the investment vehicle is not able to co-invest and that it 
cannot clearly benefit from the measure.  
It can be noted that in the case law, normally the manager is not dealt separately at 
the intermediary level. There is a presumption of no aid, if the manager is chosen 
through open and transparent procedure. If the manger’s remuneration does not 
reflect market terms, then it might constitute a State aid.  Thus, it is well possible 
that the manager would be also a recipient of aid.220 
Having developed such a concept of indirect recipient of State aid, it can be argued 
that both the Commission and the Court apply the Article 107(1) TFEU in quite an 
expansive way.  
12. The Problematic Selectivity Criterion – Further Questions 
12.1. What is Reference Framework in CIV Context? 
When assessing selectivity, the first phase of selectivity test requires that the gen-
eral framework is identified, in order to show that the measure in question derogates 
from the general system in a selective way. The reference system thus is the bench-
mark, against which the measure’s selectivity is assessed.221 
According to the Commission 2016 Notice, with no reference to case law of ECJ, 
the reference system consists of ‘a consistent set of rules that generally apply - on 
the basis of objective criteria - to all undertakings falling within its scope as defined 
by its objective’. The Commission clarifies that in a typical situation, ‘[…]those rules 
define not only the scope of the system, but also the conditions under which the 
system applies, the rights and obligations of undertakings subject to it and the tech-
nicalities of the functioning of the system’.222 The Commission does not refer to the 
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case law at all when it determines the reference system in the 2016 Notice. Despite 
of this, the Commission’s view is not controversial to EJC’s. Although, a reference 
to the case law would have clarified this, and left no space for suspicions of Com-
mission’s own interpretations. A reason for the lack of references is probably that 
the Court has not never actually taken any general view, but only determined the 
system in a specific context. 
The theoretical idea of reference framework seems first clear, but there lies many 
problems in the identifying process. On the one hand, the framework can be too 
narrow or too wide, and on the other, in the end the derogation and thus selectivity 
is directly dependable on the wideness of the reference framework. In the ultimate 
end lies the possibility that the measure itself would be regarded as the framework 
itself. In the other ultimate end lies on the opposite the question that how small parts 
can the total tax system be divided in.  
The Commission notes on its 2016 Notice that ‘[…] for example, a reference system 
could be identified with regard to the corporate income tax system223, the VAT sys-
tem, or the general system of taxation of insurance.’224 According to the Commis-
sion, the reference system itself is based on elements, such as the tax base and the 
taxable persons.225 Hence, the Court and the Commission seem to have a reason-
able view with regard to the reference system. The rationale behind seem to be that 
the reference framework is a coherent set of rules. Yet, one must anyway note, that 
the Court has used various terms when it refers to the reference system. It has used 
for example the terms of ‘ordinary tax system’226 , general tax scheme’227 and ‘nor-
mal regime’228.229 
States having prerogative in tax matters means that the benchmark can be only a 
situation within a state. So, the benchmark in fiscal matters can only be the tax leg-
islation of one country. This is also due to that the comparative analysis between 
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economic operators is made ‘in light of objective assigned to the tax system of the 
Member State concerned’.230 Widening the benchmark, and making the reference 
framework a gross-border consideration, would not be possible, due to the nature 
of taxation and State aid.  
Yet, in the case of tax exemption, determining the reference framework, i.e. the 
general regime, is more complex. This is due to that the aid now consists of failure 
to act, i.e. to impose a tax. In the legal literature, Claire Micheau has presented a 
view that in order to determine that failure to be an expenditure, a hypothetical tax 
should be determined.231 When performing this study, the author has not collided 
with any case argumentation in which any hypothetical taxes would have been de-
termined before deciding the reference framework.  
However, the case law proves that it is possible that the reference system is a nar-
rower set of rules than just for example a corporate tax system. In the case VTM 
Fund management, which concerned the taxation of investment companies, the 
EFTA Court identified the taxation of all undertakings as the reference system for 
normal taxation by stating that ‘it is common ground that the measures at hand do 
not apply to all economic operators, but are granted only to undertakings exercising 
a specific activity in a determined legal form, that is investment companies.232 
In addition, one must keep in mind, that this reference framework and a derogation 
from it alone does not constitute State aid. The measure may either be justified or 
the situation may be that the derogation nevertheless does not result in selectivity, 
for example due to the fact that the economic operator(s) cannot be held in a com-
parable situation to its comparison operator group. The latter was indeed the situa-
tion in Paint Graphos233.  
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12.2. Should Aid be Quantified with Reference to Other Investment 
Funds, Investment Companies or to What? (The Comparison 
Test and its New Forms) 
The next section in this paper analyses more about the selectivity criteria, and the 
aforementioned comparison test. The research question whether the aid is quanti-
fied with reference to other investment funds or to other companies, is on the spot-
light in this section. First the research focuses to find this kind of argumentation from 
the case law and Commission’s decision. Some references were already made in 
the above sections.   
As mentioned, the Paint Graphos initially set the comparison test used in nowadays 
and which focuses on the assessment of different treatment between ‘economic 
operators, who in light of objective assigned to the tax system of the Member State 
concerned, are in a comparable factual and legal situation’.234 The comparability 
seem to require a considerable competitive relationship235, but is something which 
is assessed case-by-case.  
A query must now be made into the case law in order to answer more specifically to 
the question what does this test actually mean and what does the comparison re-
quire in the CIV context. First, it must be borne in mind that the intermediary may 
have various forms: it may or may not have a legal status. It may be a company or 
it can as well be just a bundle of assets without any certain legal form. These many 
possible forms make the comparing process complex, adding difficulties to a coher-
ent application of law. 
Criticism has been set forth in the academic literature, and for a good reason. The 
three-step test is far from consistent. One view set forth in the academic literature 
is that ‘the Court prefers a substantial approach’, which means that the Court instead 
of carrying out a proper comparison regarding the comparison groups’ treatment 
and ‘intrinsic and extrinsic objectives,’ instead applies an effect based approach (i.e. 
the analysis of the effects of state’s tax system as a whole). This kind of application 
method makes possible to reach the desired outset.236 Especially, in the case Paint 
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Graphos, the Court held that the cooperatives in question where not comparable to 
the for-profit societies or other cooperatives under the objective of profit taxation. 
Thus, the adopted application was a very broad one, even though it did not result in 
selectivity. It is notable that here the Court did weigh the special features of the 
cooperative societies in a few paragraphs, and noted that these features make them 
separable from the others economical actors.237 
The Commission has stated in its 2016 Notice that the comparison is to be made ‘in 
the light of the intrinsic objective of the system of reference’, referring to the case 
Paint Graphos and to the Court’s argumentation in that case where it nevertheless 
considered that the cooperative societies could not be compared. According to case 
law, ‘external objectives cannot be relied upon the member state’.238  
Therefore, another important question is the distinction between corporations and 
non-incorporated businesses, and consequently how they are determined and sep-
arated. In the older Notice (2014), the Commission considers ‘all undertakings hav-
ing an income [. . .] to be in a similar legal and factual situation from the perspective 
of direct company taxation’.239 The author noted that this phrase is something that 
the Commission does not repeat in its 2016 Notice, although it refers to the same 
case law (Paint Graphos) and also that the 2016 Notice’s structure is pretty much 
similar at that point (‘Identification of the reference system’). Despite the lack of this 
phrase in 2016 Notice, the author sees in the light of the case law researched, that 
the approach (‘ all undertakings having an income…’) has not changed radically 
since 2014.  
In the before mentioned case Fineco, the Court noted that the measure was selec-
tive because it was intended to be limited to well-defined investment vehicles and 
their managing undertakings, for ‘the detriment of other undertakings offering alter-
native forms of investment’. 240 In Fineco the group of comparison was set vastly. 
Nonetheless, this does not mean that the group of comparison could be regarded 
to cover also the ‘normal companies’ because the wording defines that these un-
dertakings must ‘offer […] forms of investment’. Seeing in such a way (i.e. excluding 
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normal companies) it means that the comparison group was basically the other in-
vestment companies. Furthermore, again the Court was quite short-spoken what 
comes to the comparison itself. No such ‘special features’ analysis was made, as 
was the situation for example in Paint Graphos, where the cooperatives’ special 
features were listed and analysed in detail and compared to the for-profit organiza-
tions.  
Before drawing conclusion, a case VTM Fund management is examined in a light 
on the comparison group and will be investigated separately in the following para-
graph.  
12.2.1. E-17/10 and E-06/11 - Principality of Liechtenstein 
and VTM Fund Management v EFTA Surveillance Author-
ity  
The EFTA Court in VTM Fundmanagement decision established the presence of 
selectivity by directly comparing the taxation of investment companies with the tax-
ation of investment funds.  
The case concerned a Liechtenstein set of tax rules introduced already in the 1996. 
Those rules applied to ‘the collective capital of investment undertakings, including 
[both] investment funds and investment companies’, which were exempted from the 
income tax and were subject to a reduced capital taxation. In addition, the coupon 
tax was removed. Regardless of the literal formulation, the 1996 measures resulted 
in a different treatment regarding the taxation of own assets of investment funds and 
investment companies. The investment funds remained under the normal taxation 
due to that its own assets were separated from the assets it managed.241 
The Court stated that, as these 1996 measures ‘do not apply to all economic oper-
ators in Liechtenstein, these measures cannot be considered to be general 
measures of tax or economic policy’ and the tax exemption was held to be against 
the mechanism of the tax system in question.242 Instead of that it was regarded that 
the measure indeed was built to attract certain undertakings.243 
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The EFTA Court ruled that the investment companies were treated selectively and 
determined the comparison group as ‘other fund management undertakings operat-
ing in Liechtenstein’. Here the focus seemed to be on the similar characteristics in 
their common operations, and the Court went on by stating that the investment funds 
also ‘offer the same kind of services in the Liechtenstein’. 244 Unfortunately, the 
Court did not determine more closely what exactly made these two companies sim-
ilar. Although, the Court did state that the fact that the companies and funds differ 
by their legal forms, did not affect to the result.245 The author refers to the above 
‘Selectivity’ section and wants to note that it is settled case law that the legal struc-
ture of undertaking does not prevent the application of TFEU 107(1). 
12.2.2. Conclusions 
As a matter of fact, the whole rational behind the comparison is actually the prohi-
bition of providing unequal treatment in a comparable situation.246 Thus, the whole 
selectivity analysis and especially the comparison process, is about analysing the 
joint features and differences. To start the features comparison process, it must be 
identified which features are to be compared, i.e. determine the tertium compara-
tionis.247 
Both Fineco and VTM Fundmanagement cases indicated that the comparison is not 
made vastly with reference to the other ‘normal companies’.248 In Fineco the com-
parison was made to the ‘other undertakings offering alternative forms of invest-
ment’.249 Whereas, in VTM Fundmanagement the comparison group was ‘other fund 
management undertakings operating in Liechtenstein’.250 In both Fineco and VTM 
Fundmanagement thus the investment companies and investment funds were as-
similated.  
In addition, it seems that the legal form does not have much, if any, decisive power 
to the comparison. Especially in VTM Fundmanagement, the Court concluded that 
                                                 
244 Id., para 58.  
245 Id., para, 62.  
246 Lang, Michael 2016, page 36. 
247 Id., page 36.  
248 Douma, Sjoerd 2014, page 180.  
249 T-445/05, Fineco, para 150. 




‘[t]he fact that investment companies and investment funds do not have the same 
legal form cannot affect this conclusion.’251 
Roland Ismer argued in his article, when commenting the VTM Fundmanagement, 
that the comparison test is not a necessary condition, but rather a simplifying ele-
ment in the assessment process. Ismer regarded that the analysis started with the 
identifying of the reference system and ‘then went on to establish the presence of 
selectivity by directly comparing the taxation of investment companies with the tax-
ation of investment funds’.252  
The author does not share Ismer’s view in total, and thinks that this directly ‘went 
on to establish the selectivity’ must have indeed contained the comparison process, 
although possibly in a straightforward form. The author thinks that it is the wording 
of the judgment which at first glance seem to hide this comparing process. Yet, the 
comparison can be seen in the wording of the case. Expressly, the paragraph 58, 
in which the EFTA Court established the selectivity ‘in comparison with other fund 
management undertakings’, proves the comparison.  
Regarding the said, the author noted that Ismer joints his argumentation to the new 
approach, i.e. that the Court does not anymore rely on concrete comparisons under 
the three-step test, but rather relies on the abstract selectivity arguing.253 Whichever 
the truth, alone the fact that the Court would have omitted a more simplified method 
regarding the comparison does not mean that this step would have been forgotten. 
As stated above, the rationale behind is to ensure the equal treatment. Thus, the 
author sees that this comparison part of the three-step test (or argumentation) can 
be ignored competently, and the Court may change its argumentation, only up to 
the point in which it is certain that the equal treatment is secured.  
The pawn is the comparison to be made ‘in the light of the objective assigned to the 
tax system’. One reason why it seems reasonable that the comparison could be 
made alternatively also in relation to other companies, is that if ‘the objective as-
signed to the tax system’ is regarded as taxing company profits, the ‘normal com-
panies’ would be within such a comparison group.  Therefore, from the author’s 
point of view, the argumentations used so far might also indicate the fact that there 
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have not been a necessity to extend the group of comparison to cover farther 
groups, and thus cannot be ultimately relied as a proof. Thus, even the literal inter-
pretation would render such application. 
Hence, it appears that the Court indeed follows increasingly a more case-by-case 
analysis in the comparison part of the three-step test, and thus the de facto -analysis 
seems to gain increasingly more and more scope as a method in the application 
process. 
12.3. Availability to Certain? 
Besides the above, the selectivity analysis does contain another element which 
must be determined. The Article 107 (1) TFEU prohibits advantages which are 
awarded to ‘certain enterprises’ and to ‘the production of certain goods’. The author 
regards that ‘certain’ as a word means something that is separable from the others, 
something that must have its own special features which make it ‘certain’. The word-
ing itself is rather wide and leaves much discretion. But, in the light of case law, it 
seems that this is not a separated question and is thus dealt together (or within) the 
comparison phase of the three-step test. The ‘certain’ determination seem to relate 
to the undertaking determination, which is the starting point for the comparison itself.  
The word ‘certain’ relates to the group of comparison. It is argued in the legal litera-
ture that a lack of a clearly demarcated favoured group(s) in the case law does not 
automatically mean that the case should always be a one with the clear borderlines 
and that selectivity could not arise also in the situation of unclearly demarcated com-
parison group.254 The author challenges this view and sets a question that if no clear 
demarcation is required, what relevance would the word ‘certain’ have then?  
‘Certain’ may also be understood regionally and may thus mean that the undertak-
ings of a specific area are regarded as a ‘certain group’.255 However, in the CIV-
context, it is hard to see that the benchmark could be assessed regionally, as the 
impacts of tax measures normally do not cover only one specific area. 
When there is a situation where the measure seems to be open to all (i.e. a general 
exception or similar), it can be argued that it does not constitute selectivity if the 
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measure is ‘effectively open to all’.256 In this kind of situation the three-step test may 
not be sufficient to establish selectivity. Thus, the so called positive test, as called 
by Ismer, which points out that the limitation, would be needed. 257 According to the 
Ismer, this has been adapted by the Court in the cases Banco Santander and San-
tusa and Autogrill España.258 But, this positive test-view has aroused objection. 
The ECJ indeed took the opposite view in the following decision and stated that the 
General Court ‘erred in law’ when it determined that the Commission would have 
been made the so called ‘positive test’ as a first step.259 Sufficient was that the Com-
mission established the derogation from the normal tax system, and it results in 
practice to a different treatment, nevertheless that the groups that receive the ben-
efit and the groups that do not, are in a similar position in the light of the tax sys-
tem.260 
Thus, ‘certain’ within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU is apparently neither defi-
nite nor applied necessarily by its literal reading. It means, on its own, nothing and 
cannot thus be examined separately and must be applied under the terms set in the 
three-step test.   
13. Further Questions  
As the author did not find much recent case law, but mainly the Commission’s deci-
sion in which would have been investigated the concept of case law, one must seek 
to find a reason for this absence. At the first, it comes to one’s mind that the Com-
mission simply have not investigated more precisely any CIV schemes. Possibly 
they have been clear enough from the perspective of State aid. Yet, it is hard to 
believe that the Commission would not have jumped into this problem since 2009 
Fineco ruling. However, as the situation remains the same regarding the case law, 
one must ask why. 
Obviously, there are many possible answers. To start with, there have been issued 
decisions, as the aforementioned sections prove, but they almost every time refer 
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to the risk scheme financing. For certain, the reason simply cannot be every time 
that the measures are designed to promote risk financing. In addition, it is hard to 
believe that the member states would not have designed such measures during the 
present years that there would not have been any suspicious of favouring certain 
enterprises over others. Unfortunately, answering thoroughly to that question, i.e. 
what have been designed by the member states, and consequently could that situ-
ation tell something about the investigation border of the Commission, is too vast to 
be answered and researched under this study.  
When looking for an answer to this, the author ran into visions which might provide 
an answer. To start with, could it be that the State aid concept is disregarded? If so 
by what? Consequently, could the fundamental freedoms pass over the Article 
107(1)?  Hence, what happens in an overlapping situation? To answer thoroughly 
to these kind of questions, one would need to write another thesis. Thus, the over-
lapping situation among others can unfortunately be investigated only superficially.  
But, even a superficial inquiry may indicate if there lies a reason for the lack of the 
State aid investigation within the CIV context. Furthermore, that area where the 
State aid is confronted by the fundamental legal elements, indicates whether there 
actually can be measures that are not determined as State aid issues.   
13.1. Fundamental Freedoms and State aid – Overlapping Situation  
It is settled case law that the member states must ‘not introduce or maintain legis-
lation which entails incompatible State aid or discrimination that is contrary to the 
fundamental freedoms’.261 Hence, what if legislation of this kind is introduced? 
With reference to the aforementioned Walloon CIV-case, which was shortly exam-
ined above, the Commission did not decide the case on the basis of the State aid 
rules. The Commission ended up deciding the case on the basis of freedom of es-
tablishment and the free movement of workers. Yet, it seemed quite obvious that 
the measure indeed was in the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU.  
In the context of State aid, there seems to lie fundamentally the possibility of over-
lapping with the other Articles of TFEU. Hereby, is it possible to apply a combined 
                                                 




approach? Or can there be a situation where fundamental freedoms would over-
rule?  
It is ‘exceptional’ that the State aid rules are even briefly mentioned in a case con-
cerning fundamental freedoms.262 This lack of references and mentions addresses 
also the fact that the Court has not regarded the issue even as worth to mention. 
Either not much legal academic literature about the issue has been written.263 The 
existing literature tends to refer to the case Iannelli & Volpi, which dates back to 
1977. Despite of the lack of case law, it is obvious, that there must have been such 
overlapping situations. 
One must bear in mind that both the fundamental freedoms and the State aid rules 
aim to ensure that the free competition on the internal market is not distorted and 
that in an objectively comparable situation, the treatment does not differ. Hence, the 
objective of these two sets of provisions is pretty much the same, or at least close 
to each other.264 
13.1.1.1. Iannelli & Volpi 
In Iannelli & Volpi265 the Court had to decide whether the measure at issue had to 
be examined from the point of State aid rules or the free movement of goods.266 The 
Court recognized the existence of a situation where more than one Community law 
provision applied to the measure at issue. Further, the Court ruled that the Commis-
sion cannot declare a State aid regime to be compatible with the internal market 
when an approval of such a regime would end to a violation of the Treaty, including 
the fundamental freedoms.267 This view has been maintained ever since 1977.268 
The Court acknowledged that the provisions of TFEU have each a different field of 
application. In the State aid context, it is also only the Commission, not the national 
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Courts, who has the competence to review the aid measure’s compatibility with the 
internal market.269 This principle as well has been maintained ever since.270 
A distinction must be made between a measure where the State aid aspects may 
be evaluated separately in the light of the provisions of TFEU, and where they can-
not. Separable aspects can be reviewed distinctly, provided that the other TFEU 
provisions are not necessary to attain the objective of aid measure in question.271 
When the situation is such that there are ‘aspects of aid that contravene specific 
provisions of the Treaty’ [other than the Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU], which 
are so ‘indissolubly linked to the object of the aid that it is impossible to evaluate the 
aid separable’, the aid must be reviewed as a whole under the procedure of the 
[Article 108], [ex.] Article 93. The assessment of ‘indissoluble linking’ have been 
referred as a ‘severability test’.272  
In the light of the referred legal academic literature written on the issue, the author 
sees that when this ‘indissoluble connection’ exists, the aid should be reviewed un-
der a State aid procedure, and the case cannot be concluded in a member state’s 
court. Only the Commission is competent to review those provisions in such a 
case.273 Nevertheless, one must remember that the Commission is just the super-
vising authority and it does not have the power to determine the scope of the Article 
107(1) itself.  
The author thus interprets the case similarly as Frank Engelen, and sees that the 
national court may review the aid’s compatibility with the other TFEU provisions in 
a situation where there are not any aspect in the aid which would be indissolubly 
linked for the object of the aid. Nonetheless, only those aspects can be reviewed 
with regard to the compatibility with the fundamental freedoms. In addition, the Court 
concluded that if there is an aspect which is not necessary for the attainment of the 
object, and infringes the TFEU, the national court however cannot declare the aid’s 
incompatibility with the TFEU as a whole.274 Thus, the national court may take such 
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an application where it ends up applying other TFEU articles than the State aid rules, 
although at first it seems that the measure in question is a State aid issue.    
But how to determine the barrier, i.e. when there is such an indissolubly linked situ-
ation? Furthermore, what constitutes separable aspects? It seems that the ques-
tions is still unclear. Despite of the author’s contribution to seek for a clear argumen-
tation on the practical application of severability test, no clear view was found.  
Nevertheless, after 1977, the General Court has applied the severability test in var-
ious judgments.275 The General Court has followed the Court of Justice in its argu-
mentation. It has confirmed that the Commission cannot approve any aid that in-
fringes the fundamental freedoms. Further, it has stated that it is sometimes con-
ceivable, ‘that the separate aspects of State aid are evaluated under the fundamen-
tal freedoms, if the aspects in concern are not absolutely necessary in the light of 
the objective of aid’.276  
Despite of the said, the situation remains blur, as the Court has not provided any 
clarifications. Especially, would it still be possible for an EU-citizen to claim a viola-
tion of a fundamental freedom, after when the Commission has already approved 
the scheme (based on the Article TFEU 108, which concerns only the competence 
of Commission in the State aid matters)277?  
13.1.1.2. Sardegna 
Another classic overlapping case was at hand in the Sardegna decision. The case 
concerned a regional tax measure in Sardinia, with a purpose to collect a tax on 
stopovers for tourist purposes by aircraft used for private transport. The measure 
was limited only to operators whose tax domicile was outside the territory of the 
region.278 As a consequence, the aircraft service providers from elsewhere than 
Sardegna were treated disadvantageously. 
In this case the Italian constitutional court asked from the ECJ whether the measure 
restricted the freedom to provide services and/or infringed the State aid provisions. 
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The ECJ established, that the measure in questions both infringed the State aid 
provisions and constituted a restriction to the freedom to provide services.279 The 
material selectivity criterion was met, because it did not apply to all subjects acting 
in Sardinia.280 It is possible that the reasoning would have differed should the Com-
mission have started the investigation. 
Hence, does the argumentation in Sardegna mean that any tax measure imposed 
on non-residents, which is in breach of fundamental freedoms, infringes also the 
State aid provisions? First of all, the overlapping was true only in case of non-Italian 
undertakings, as the scope of State aid is limited to cover solely undertakings within 
an internal territory, whereas the fundamental freedoms do not apply in pure internal 
situations.281 Unfortunately, the ECJ did not take a stand on the priority between the 
State aid provisions and the fundamental freedoms.282  
13.1.1.3. Conclusions 
It is clear from the above mentioned Sardegna case law that a measure may fall 
both to the categories of State aid and fundamental freedoms. In this kind of situa-
tion the severability test seeks to provide for an answer. The test is a proof that State 
aid does have an area where it collides with the fundamental freedoms.  
Frank Engelen states in reference to the case Sardegna that while a tax measure 
favours resident undertakings, it can be reviewed only in the light of State aid provi-
sions. Whereas, according to him, the free movement provisions may be applied if 
the measure constitutes a disadvantage to non-residents. Further, he argues that 
both situations cannot occur simultaneously for this reason, which is why there is no 
conflict regarding the remedy that would be applicable.283  
Another kind of view with reference to Sardegna is presented by Luja. He saw that 
the application of full State aid concept (including the recovery) ‘would have taken 
away both the State aid … [and] the infringement of the freedoms of services’ as 
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both parties would then be treated alike.
284
 Yet, he goes on by arguing that ‘the 
Commission’s approval of any State aid fulfilling one of the objectives of Article 
108(3) TFEU cannot in itself provide a justification for an infringement of one of the 
fundamental freedoms’. Thus, Luja sees the connection more linked and prefers an 
effective based approach, the goal being the equal treatment. 
However, the Court has neither argued on the priority nor on the practical applica-
tion. It seems that the Court has applied a teleological application. The issue of 
cumulative application has nevertheless been raised ‘as a theoretical legal defense 
argument in other cases’.285 Hence, Engelen’s view and the arguments do not have 
much backing in the case law (if any). Yet, Engelen’s argumentation is logical and 
such an interpretation the ECJ could well adapt. The author thinks that if the 
Engelen’s representation would work, and the author cannot see a reason why it 
would not, there would not be any need to apply such an approach presented by 
Luja. Mainly, because it is settled case law already that the regional framework in 
which the State aid concept can be reviewed is within a state.  
In the light of this study, this brief inquiry indicates the possibility, and even a certain 
probability, that it is also due to the national courts that certain situations may not 
have been investigated as State aid issues, because the national court has inter-
preted the ‘severability test’ in a way that the ‘indissolubly connection’ does not exist. 
Furthermore, there is a probability of certain degree, that the national court has in-
terpreted the ‘severability test’ wrong, even purposefully.  
14. Final Remarks 
The assumption in the beginning of this study was that tax neutrality would have 
ruled the argumentation in the case law. Surprisingly, this was not the case. Yet, 
despite of that it seems that there is a certain dichotomy between benefits which 
result from the legal structure as such (e.g. a ‘mere intermediary’ approach) and 
benefits which are awarded on the other basis.  
A measure with a purpose to ensure tax neutrality is something that is required be-
cause of a legal form or structure: neutrality need to be achieved with a separate 
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measure. For that reason, any measure with a purpose of tax neutrality, should au-
tomatically justify the measure. Unfortunately, there is not enough case law in the 
CIV-taxation context that it could be thoroughly answered to whether the purpose of 
tax neutrality itself suffices and justifies the measure in any case. On the other hand, 
there seem not to lie any abstract legal understanding of the term neutrality.  
Another result of this study is an observation that the issue of CIV-taxation in the 
State aid context has been much dealt under risk financing. That derives naturally 
from the fact, that the article 107(3) TFEU may justify a risk financing measure.  But, 
the principles adopted under risk financing apply only to the risk finance schemes, 
according to the Commission. Despite of the investment objective (being it risk fi-
nancing or just real estate), it is presumable that in a situation where a measure 
concerns something other than risk financing, same kind of general principles and 
approaches would be applied. The basic selectivity principles for example indicate 
this.  
What comes to the general trends of State aid, it seems that the concept of de facto 
selectivity is dominating more and more, and the three-step assessment test ever 
less used. Moreover, the concept of indirect selectivity ensures that the Article 
107(1) TFEU cannot be circumvented by channelling the benefit to either individual 
investors or to the ultimate beneficiaries. Overall, the actual selectivity assessment 
is changing towards a pure case-by-case analysis, threatening foreseeability. 
Fineco also demonstrated that the advantage received may be indirect and for ex-
ample a mere increase in liquidity suffices to constitute a benefit.  
Furthermore, the exact case analysing is much about comparing. With regards to 
the comparison group, the author noted that the pursued result might be achieved 
even if the comparison group is not extended to the farthest possible group. In the 
above sections, it was noted that the comparison group in the CIV-context usually 
is extended to the other similar companies offering alternative forms of investments 
(e.g. Fineco T-445/05).  
Overall, when talking about the beginning of the State aid investigation, this study 
has now ended up to a kind of cross-road situation. In this CIV-context, it really 
seems that the fundamental freedoms may overrule the issue being regarded as a 
State aid case. This of course weakens the importance of State aid regulation and 




TFEU 107. It is a possibility that a future trend will be narrower application of State 
aid rules. Nonetheless, as found, the ultimate objective of these two set of rules do 
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